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INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, a U.S.-initiated drone strike in Pakistan accidentally
killed U.S. citizen Warren Weinstein and Italian aid worker Giovanni Lo Porto.
President Obama compensated the familiesi and gave a long speech in which
he indicated that he "want[ed] to express our grief and condolences to the
families of two hostages." 2 The President justified his declassification and
disclosure of this strike "because the [] families deserved to know the truth."3
He also offered the following mea culpa: "As President and as Commander-in-
Chief, I take full responsibility for all our counterterrorism operations . . . . I
profoundly regret what happened. On behalf of the United States Government,
I offer our deepest apologies."' He concluded the discussion of the strike by
noting,
I have directed a full review of what happened. We will identify the lessons that can
be learned from this tragedy and any changes that should be made. We will do our
utmost to ensure it is not repeated. And we will continue to do everything we can to
prevent the loss of innocent lives-not just innocent Americans, but all innocent
lives-in our counterterrorism operations. 5
In October 2015, a U.S. airstrike hit a Doctors Without Borders trauma
hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing twenty-two people. President Obama
apologized to Dr. Joanne Liu, the head of Doctors Without Borders, promising
that "he would make any changes necessary to ensure that such incidents were
less likely in the future," including a "full accounting" of the event and
consideration of the military's rules of engagement.6 The Administration
offered compensation to the families of those killed and injured.' Over the
following months, the Pentagon completed a comprehensive investigation,
disciplined numerous military personnel, and identified "a number of specific
actions to . . . mitigate the potential for similar incidents in the future."
Contrast the responses to these incidents with how the United States has
generally responded to the families of local civilians that it viewed itself as
1. Peter Baker, Obama Apologized After Drone Kills American and Italian Held by Al
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostages-
were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html.
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo




6. Michael D. Shear & Somnin Sengupta, Obama Issues Rare Apology Over Bombing of
Doctors Without Borders Hospital in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/10/08/world/asia/obama-apologizes-for-bombing-of-afghanistan-hospital.html.
7. Afghan Hospital Bombing: Pentagon To Pay Compensation to Families, GUARDIAN (Oct.
11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/i/kunduz-pentagon-to-pay-compensation-
over-afghan-hospital-bombing.
8. Barbara Starr & Ryan Browne, Pentagon: U.S. Bombing of Afghanistan Hospital Not a
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having lawfully killed or injured during military operations. Unsurprisingly,
direct presidential apologies, like those offered above, are reserved for truly
exceptional cases.9 When the United States has killed or injured local civilians
during military operations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq-places where
the United States has engaged in formally recognized armed conflict-the
United States has tended neither to directly acknowledge its causal
responsibility nor to make promises of non-repetition, though it has often
provided small monetary payments as an expression of sympathy to affected
families-disbursements known as condolence or solatia payments."o As for
local civilians killed or injured in places where the United States does not
acknowledge its military involvement, like Yemen or Pakistan, the United
States has not offered direct information, apology, or money to families." On
occasion, however, it may have filtered solatia or condolence payments to the
affected family through their home government.
States need not always approach foreign lives in the same manner as
domestic ones,' 2 but the taking of foreign lives and the treatment of families in
the aftermath of such killings deserves thoughtful attention and justification.
This is especially so when estimates of civilian casualties caused by the United
States and its allies during the War on Terror reach into the thousands.' 3
Although recent improvements in U.S. ground and air strike policies have
reduced civilian casualties,1 4 they still occur and we can expect them to occur
9. While Obama did directly acknowledge responsibility for the accidental deaths of
American and Italian aid workers in Pakistan and Anwar al-Awlaki's American-born son, the Obama
Administration has not named any victims from Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen. Charlie Savage & Scott
Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll from Airstrikes Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-
zones.html; Naureen Shah, Obama Order Looks To Curb Civilian Deaths in US. Airstrikes and Drone
Attacks, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 1, 2016, 6:46 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/obama-order-looks-
to-curb-civilian-deaths-in-u-s-airstrikes-and-drone-attacks/; Shear & Sengupta, supra note 6.
10. See infra Section 1.B.2.
11. Cora Currier, Does the U.S. Pay Families When Drones Kill Innocent Yemenis?,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/does-the-u.s.-pay-families-when-
drones-kill-innocent-yemenis (noting that a Pentagon spokesperson said no condolence payments have
been made in Yemen and central command has revealed that it has thirty-three pages on condolence in
Yemen but will not release them); Amrit Singh, Death By Drones: Civilian Harm Caused by U.S.
Targeted Killings in Yemen, OPEN Soc'Y FOUND. 31 (2015), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org
/sites/default
/files/death-drones-report-eng-20150413.pdf. Though the United States does not have a condolence or
solatia program in Pakistan, it has disbursed money to the Pakistani government for the provision of
medical, psychological, and livelihood assistance to those in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. After the Dead Are Counted, U.S. and Pakistani Responsibilities to Victims
ofDrone Strikes, OPEN SoC'Y FOUND. 23 (2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default
/files/after-dead-are-counted-20141120.pdf; Conflict Victims Support Project, Pakistan, U.S. AGENCY
INT'L DEv. (Oct. 1, 2013), https://sems.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/CVSP.pdf.
12. Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499, 512 (2014).
13. The difficulties of generating precise civilian casualty data are legion. See generally
COUNTING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO RECORDING AND ESTIMATING NONMILITARY
DEATHS IN CONFLICT (Taylor B. Sebolt et al., eds., 2013) (estimating that civilian casualties induced by
the United States and its allies during the War on Terror reach into the thousands); Neta C. Crawford,
War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, BROWN
U.WATSON INST. COST OF WAR PROJECT 20 (2015) (noting the difficulties of determining the indirect
death toll of conflicts).
14. See CIA and US Military Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to Present, BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/INAfFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HIGtO9
1232017]
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in conflicts to come. While international and domestic law provide some means
of redress, however imperfect, for unlawful killings during armed conflicts,"
the law says little about redress for lawful harms. But when law authorizes
harm, as it does for certain civilian deaths and injuries during armed conflict,
states should design processes for making amends that recognize the humanity
of affected civilians and their families,' 6 and that offer both the injured and the
injurer a mechanism for addressing that harm.
In this Article, we offer some thoughts on the limitations of current
practices for making solatia and condolence payments after lawful civilian
deaths in satisfying the essential demands of amends for the recipient and the
giver, and how those demands might inform the design of amends making
processes in this context. While many have grappled with how to appropriately
respond to the victims of unlawful harm," analysis of the complexities of
responding to the victims of lawful harm is significantly less developed. And,
wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=1000652376 (reporting a steep decline in the number of civilian
casualties from U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan since 2012) (last visited Jan. 10, 2015); see also US
Strikes in Yemen, 2002 to Present, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/lIbIhEYJomIlSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2ALKz5KQ/edit#gid
=97725626 (last visited Jan. 10, 2015) (reporting a reduction in the number of civilian casualties from
U.S. drone'strikes in Yemen since 2014). On the other hand, independent monitoring groups suggest
U.S. drone strikes against ISIS in Syria have resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties. See Alice Ross,
Hundreds of Civilians Killed in US-led Air Strikes on ISIS Targets - Report, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/20 15/aug/03/us-led-air-strikes-on-isis-targets-killed-more-than-450-
civilians-report.
15. See infra Part 1.
16. See infra Section II.A.
17. Amends may also have value as a response to unlawful harm. Existing law, however, if
properly implemented and enforced, can satisfy many of the functions of amends in the context of
unlawful harm. On the demand-side, the process leading to a criminal determination of unlawfulness
ought to provide an explanation of the events leading to the victim's death. The subsequent punishment
should deter repetition and states may also choose to respond to criminal investigations with reform and
promises of non-repetition. Both the willingness to prosecute and the subsequent sentence can serve as
an acknowledgement of the victim's worth and function as the state's acceptance of responsibility. The
reparations that accompany grave IHL breaches are now generally understood to include more than
financial compensation; they ought to include restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition,
and satisfaction (acknowledgement of wrongdoing) as well. See G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, ¶ 18 (Dec. 16, 2005). In
fact, our notion of "amends" mirrors this expansive understanding of what it is that victims are owed in
the wake of unlawful state-imposed harms. Similarly, on the supply-side, criminal prosecutions may
help win hearts and minds by disavowing violations of the law, allow individuals an opportunity for
moral repair, and enhance military professionalism by reinforcing codes of conduct.
That said, status quo criminal proceedings notoriously lack a victim-orientation. Often the
victim's only role is to participate as a witness and the victim's family may be largely left out of the
process. Criminal proceedings may not always signal acceptance of state responsibility, but rather may
be viewed as shifting the focus to a single perpetrator or a handful of perpetrators. In addition, as
currently conducted, these proceedings are neither designed to restore the victim nor performed with any
special attention to cultural appropriateness. Moreover, the United States does not currently provide
monetary reparations to individuals in the wake of criminal proceedings. Rather, as we describe in Part
1, such individuals may receive condolence or solatia payments independent of the outcome of criminal
proceedings.
Amends, therefore, might usefully be offered as a complement to criminal proceedings for unlawful
harms. We do not focus our attention on this possibility here, however, as we believe both legal reform
and scholarly discussions are already seriously grappling with the issues surrounding appropriate
responses to the victims of unlawful harm. Moreover, while improvements in criminal justice and
reparations might address the problems of unlawful harms, they would do little to confront the lacuna
raised by lawful harms. Thus, we focus here on the circumstances of lawful harm.
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while many have urged coordination and standardization of solatia and
condolence payments, 8 scant attention has been paid to how the absence of
elements such as responsibility-taking or the promise of non-repetition might
affect both those who have been injured and those who seek to make amends.
The oft-repeated assumption that a simple program in the form of monetary
payments can recognize human dignity, win hearts and minds, and benefit the
providing troops is often asserted, but has yet to be systematically evaluated.19
Grounding our inquiry in a close examination of the military's practices and in
the empirical literature on amends and apology, we consider these payments'
effects on three important constituencies: the victims, 20 the individuals causally
responsible for the deaths, and the institutions that offer the payments. We
consider whether existing payment practices serve their intended functions with
regard to these three groups. In addition, we suggest how to integrate these
monetary payments into a larger amends program that grapples with the
complexities of responsibility-taking and promises of non-repetition,
complicated questions about who has standing to give and receive apologies for
lawfully inflicted injuries, and the difficulties inherent in cross-cultural
exchanges.
We address these design questions through the lens of the governing body
of law, international humanitarian law (IHL), which balances the needs of the
military to achieve its objectives and the desire to maintain humanitarian limits
during conflict.21 Rooted in principles of reciprocity and humanity, this law
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. See Joint Staff, Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), Briefing for Senate
Appropriations Committee (Oct. 22, 2003), as reprinted in JASON W. CONDREY, THE COMMANDER'S
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM: A MODEL FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION 17 (2010) ("When spent
well, CERP funding convinced Iraqis that the coalition was truly committed to their well-being,
increased the flow of intelligence to commanders and soldiers about hostile actors in the community,
and improved security. . . ."); Cora Currier, Hearts, Minds and Dollars: Condolence Payments in the
Drone Strike Age, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/hearts-minds-and-
dollars-condolence-payments-in-the-drone-strike-age (quoting a retired general who supported
condolence payments saying "[w]e are going to leave, and the only thing that's going to remain is the
perception of America."); Chris Rogers, Addressing Civilian Harm in Afghanistan: Policies & Practices
of International Forces, CAMPAIGN FOR INNOCENT VICTIMS IN CONFLICT 6 (2010),
http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files
/publications/Addressingcivilian-harmwhite.paper_-201 0.pdf.
20. And by extension, the communities in which they are located.
21. See infra Section L.A. Even in conflicts with lower standards than those imposed for state-
to-state conflicts, individuals must be treated humanely. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC for Armed Forces in the Field]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 796, 798 (2010) ("IHL
represents a carefully thought out balance between the principles of military necessity and humanity.
Every one of its rules constitutes a dialectical compromise between these two opposing forces."). While
President-Elect Trump has voiced some disdain for the Geneva Conventions, he has said that he
understands "that the United States is bound by laws and treaties" and that he would "not order our
military or other officials to violate those laws and will seek their advice on such matters." Ryan Browne
& Nicole Gaouette, Donald Trump Reverses Position on Torture, Killing Terrorist's Families, CNN
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/politics/donald-trump-reverses-on-torture/.
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allows combatants to legally impose harm on both combatants and civilians,
but places significant constraints on when and how that harm may be imposed.
The law's emphasis on the dignity and humanity of individuals is revealed both
by these constraints and additional requirements regarding the treatment of
those who are killed or injured.22 For instance, both the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration 23 and the Martens clause 24 enshrine the laws of humanity into IHL,
reflecting drafter F.F. Martens's view that everyone has an inviolable right to
honor and dignity. 25 Even though IHL and the attendant scholarship often focus
on how militaries ought to account for humanitarian demands when considering
actions that might impose civilian casualties, we suggest that more attention
should also be paid to how this humanitarian spirit of IHL might address the
aftermath of the harm it authorizes. We contend that the provision of well-
designed amends mechanisms to address lawfully imposed harmdoing would
enhance satisfaction of IHL's humanitarian purposes while still respecting the
inherent balance at the heart of this body of law.26
The consideration of appropriate responses to the loss of foreign lives in
the military context is particularly timely. On July 1, 2016, President Obama
issued an Executive Order on United States Policy on Pre-and Post-Strike
Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use
of Force.27 In it, he committed the United States, as a matter of policy, 28 to
"acknowledge U.S. Government responsibility for civilian casualties and offer
condolences including ex gratia payments, to civilians who are injured or to the
families of civilians who are killed." 29 In addition, the Executive Order calls for
"engage[ment] with foreign partners to share and learn best practices for
22. IHL does contain some minimal obligations that attach after the death of civilians such as:
searching for the dead, the taking of all measures to prevent the dead from being despoiled or pillaged,
returning their remains and personal effects, disposing of the dead respectfully, including the recording
of information prior to disposal, and marking the location of the graves. GC for Armed Forces in the
Field, supra note 21, arts. 15-17.
23. St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 MARTENS 474, reprinted in I SUPPLEMENT AM. J.
INT'L L. 89, 95-96 (1907) (prohibiting weapons "which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled
men, or render their death inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to
the laws of humanity" and committing States to update their weapons regulations in order to "reconcile
the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.").
24. Convention (1l) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No.
429 [hereinafter Convention 11] (stating that "populations and belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience").
25. Vladimir Vasilievich Pustogarov, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909) - A
Humanist ofModern Times, 78 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 322, 334 (1996).
26. Of course, in order to strike this balance, one must be mindful of the military's capacity
and not craft proposals so unduly burdensome that they will not be used.
27. Exec. Order No. 13,732, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,483, 44,485 (July 7, 2016). While executive
orders can be revoked by future presidents, they often stay in place because revocation can be a
politically costly act. Robert Chesney, President Obama's Executive Order on Pre/Post Airstrike
Policies and Practices, LAWFARE (July 1, 2016, 2:55 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-
obamas-executive-order-prepost-airstrike-policies-and-practices.
28. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, §§ 5(d)-(e).
29. Id. § 2(b)(ii).
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reducing the likelihood of and responding to civilian casualties." 30 Yet many
have criticized the Executive Order as insufficiently victim-oriented.3' With
implementation of the order and a change in Administration 32 both imminent, it
is an especially opportune moment to think carefully about how to design
effective amends mechanisms.
While our research most directly addresses voluntary condolence and
solatia payments for civilian victims of lawful armed conflict, it also speaks
more generally to other settings in which the law permits harm to others. This
includes other foreign military harm settings such as military claims payments
for non-combat activities, 33 reparations for unlawful military acts,34 and hero
payments.35 While the military setting is special for numerous reasons,
including the exclusion of non-U.S. citizen victims and their families from the
U.S. domestic political process, 36 it is hardly unique as a setting in which
persons and institutions may lawfully cause the deaths of others. Our analysis,
therefore, also speaks to the value and design of amends in domestic, non-
military settings such as non-negligent policing resulting in death.37
This paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we situate payments for
military takings of foreign lives in the legal and historical landscape. Looking
at both domestic and international law, we describe the existing compensation
regimes for harms imposed on the local population of a foreign country by the
30. Id. § 2(b)(iii).
3 1. Sarah Knuckey, The Good and Bad in the U.S. Government 's Civilian Casualties
Announcement, JUST SECURITY (July 2, 2016, 8:16 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/31785/good-bad-
govemments-civilian-casualties-announcement/ (criticizing the lack of victims' names in the annual
report and lack of "victim and family centered language" in the order); Jameel Jaffer, US. Releases
Official Casualty Numbers and New Executive Order on "Targeted Killing," ACLU BLOG (July 1,
2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/us-releases-official-casualty-numbers-and-new-executive-order-
targeted-killing (criticizing the Administration's lack of transparency); Shah, supra note 9 (requesting
that the Administration focus more on the individual victims).
32. As of this writing, the Civilian Casualties Executive Order is not one that President-Elect
Trump has identified as a target for repeal. Robert Chesney, Annals ofthe Trump Administration #2:
Which Executive Orders and Directives Are Doomed?, LAWFARE (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:37 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/annals-trump-administration-2-which-executive-orders-and-directives-
are-doomed (no mention of the Civilian Casualties executive order as one of the most likely security
related executive orders to be repealed); Justin Holcomb, The List ofExecutive Orders That Trump Will
Dispose oflmmediately, Townhall.com (Nov. 10, 2016), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/justinholcomb
/2016/11/10/the-list-of-executive-orders-that-trump-will-dispose-of-immediately-n2243914 (identifying
multiple executive orders for immediate rescission but omitting the Civilian Casualties Executive
Order).
33. See infra Section 1.B. 1.
34. See infra Section LA.
35. U.S. FORCES, U.S. DEP'T DEF., MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM AFGHANISTAN, USFOR-
A PUB 1-06 at 3, 5, 12 (2008) [hereinafter MAAWS-A]. Hero payments are part of the Secretary of
Defense condolence payment program, and are paid to the surviving spouse or next of kin of host
nations' personnel killed as a result of U.S., multinational, or supporting military operations. U.S. DEP'T
DEF., No.09-27 HANDBOOK: COMMANDER'S GUIDE TO MONEY AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM 70 (2009).
36. See Rowell & Wexler, supra note 12. That said, in liberal democracies, governments often
face significant political pressure to protect civilians in warfare. See Neta C. Crawford, Just War Theory
and the U.S. Counterterror War, I PERSP. ON POL. 5, 15 (2003).
37. See Tracey L. Meares, Tom R. Tyler, & Jacob Gardener, Lawful or Fair? How Cops and
Laypeople View Good Policing, - J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY _ (forthcoming); Winnifred R. Louis,
et al., Collective Harmdoing: Developing the Perspective of the Perpetrator, 21 PEACE & CONFLICT
306, 309 (2015) (noting that police who shoot in the line of duty might suffer similar consequences to
those who kill in combat).
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military. We explain the differences among regimes based on whether the harm
was incurred during combat and whether the harm was lawful. We then focus
on when and how the United States provides amends for lawful deaths incurred
during combat activities in order to lay the groundwork for evaluating those
practices in light of their possible purposes.
In Part II, we consider a number of justifications for why the United
States might make amends for the lawful killing of civilians. In so doing, we
review the existing literature on the effects of amends on victim responses to
harm and harm-doers and the effects of making amends on harm-doers
themselves, paying particular attention to research exploring the components of
amends, the central role of taking responsibility for having caused harm, the
victim's desire for reform, the question of who has standing to give and receive
amends, and the cross-cultural aspects of amends. We look first at demand-side
justifications for amends, exploring the reasons why affected individuals and
families might desire amends following harm.
We also disaggregate the supply-side reasons for amends in this setting,
exploring the military's perspective. Most accounts of amends making in this
context emphasize "winning hearts and minds" or how a military might benefit
strategically, particularly in a counterinsurgency, from successfully addressing
the grievances, security, and legitimacy needs of the local population. Less
appreciated, however, is the potential for amends making to address the moral
injury suffered by some soldiers who engage in lawful killing of civilians.
Finally, we investigate how making amends might reinforce military
professionalism by emphasizing the military's respect for humanitarian
restraints on killing in combat and its respect for civilians.
In Part III, we offer suggestions for the improved design of solatia and
condolence practices as part of a larger amends making activity. First, we frame
condolence and solatia payments as part of a relationship-oriented practice
designed to serve the needs of both the injurer and the injured. Given this
framing, we outline a redesign of current approaches that better encompasses
all aspects of amends. This would include personalized payment processes
respectful of culture and rituals, inclusion of service members who suffer from
or are at risk of experiencing moral injury, the acknowledgement of causality,
and enhanced mechanisms for facilitating the reduction of future harm. We
identify some gaps in the empirical evidence that would help predict the likely
effects of these reforms and conclude with a roadmap for future empirical
research to close these gaps.
I. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CONDOLENCE AND SOLATIA
In order to fully understand the existing condolence and solatia payments
provided to civilian victims of lawful armed conflict, one must first appreciate
the legal and factual landscape. The emerging demand for amends is best
understood against the legal background in which condolence and solatia
payments for civilians exist. We focus on those payments that states voluntarily
offer to individuals they harm. For civilians injured or killed in armed conflict,
voluntary payments offered to express sympathy are often termed "ex gratia" or
128
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"condolence" payments. When performed in accordance with local custom,
such disbursements might instead be called "solatia" payments. We are
particularly interested in mechanisms that share the following characteristics:
1) the provision of financial payments to individuals or family members that
may be accompanied by 2) an expression of sympathy, offered for 3) the death
or injury of a civilian that 4) was caused by another state engaging in the use of
force and 5) that is not currently required under international law. No legal or
moral wrongdoing is required as the impetus for such payments, though it may
be present in individual cases.
This Part introduces the international and domestic legal lacuna for lawful
victims of armed conflict as well as the possible practical lacuna for victims of
unacknowledged uses of force. 38 While civilians injured or killed by other
states' militaries may be entitled to compensation for tortious non-combat
activity or for the use of unlawful force during armed conflict, no such
compensation or other amends are currently required for the death of civilians
as a result of lawful military force. Rather, as this Part describes, a variety of
discretionary condolence and solatia efforts partially fill the gap.
A. International Law ofReparations
Under international law, states that commit a legally wrongful act in
another state's jurisdiction are generally expected to make reparations for any
38. Although a state might lawfully injure civilians in another country in a variety of settings,
we limit this conversation to the situation of armed conflicts and other uses of force. First, the aggregate
consequences of lawful harm in armed conflict are likely to be quite significant, whereas lawful harms
imposed in peacetime settings ought to be relatively infrequent. In addition, parties can seek first party
insurance for most types of harms, but it is nearly impossible to do for acts of war, particularly for those
in the countries where the United States is likely to be involved in armed conflict. Likewise, some of the
supply-side and demand-side demands are likely lessened when the state is not engaged in activity that
is high risk and designed to be lethal.
We acknowledge that amends might also make sense in other lawful harm contexts. In fact, some
areas of law already create state obligations to compensate for harm caused by lawful acts. Under
domestic and international law, for example, if a state takes privately held property for a public use, the
state has a duty to provide compensation. 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION
§ 80.08(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 2016); Oscar Schacter, Compensation fbr Expropriation, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 121 (1984). Similarly, international law recognizes the obligation for occupying powers to pay
for "requisitions in kind and services from the inhabitants of an occupied territory." See Hague
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 52, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539; Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: General Commentary,
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31, 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1; Yael Ronen, Avoid or
Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During Armed Conflict, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 12 (2009). In many states, innocent persons convicted of a crime and then exonerated
may receive compensation and other amenities as well as apologies from the state. See generally
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted (identifying the "federal
government, the District of Columbia, and 30 states" as those with compensation statutes and noting
best practices). Such amenities include provisions like tuition waivers, health care, vocational training,
and counseling. Alanna Trivelli, Note, Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted: A Proposal to Make
Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Whole Again, 19 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 257, 261-62 (2016). While a
few jurisdictions limit their statutes to instances of wrongdoing by the state, many state statutes extend
the possibility of compensation to all exonerees, including those towards whom the state behaved in
good faith. Evan J. Mandery et al., Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J.
CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 553, 559 (2013).
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harm caused. 9 Reparations can come in many forms. For individuals, the focus
is often on restitution and rehabilitation in the form of monetary
compensation. 40 But reparations also include what is termed "satisfaction"-
reinstatement of the victim's dignity by ceasing the specific individual violation
and acknowledging harm to the individual.4 1 Reparations can also include
guarantees of non-repetition that might be satisfied by reform efforts such as
training, institutional reform, and enhanced legal protections. 42
Importantly, reparations have historically been available only to victims
of unlawful harm. Harm that results from lawful conduct does not give rise to a
claim for reparations. 43 In defining lawful and unlawful acts in the armed
conflict setting, IHL seeks to strike a fundamental balance between a military's
ability to accomplish its objective of weakening or destroying opposition forces
and the desire to maintain humanitarian restraint. Modem limitations on jus in
bello (conduct in armed conflict) are predicated on the assumption that armed
conflict can be a legitimate enterprise that should be regulated rather than
prohibited. For instance, core provisions of the laws of war reflect that
belligerents may injure and kill the enemy," while the Geneva Convention
explicitly prohibits targeted "violence to life and person" of "persons taking no
active part in the hostilities."45
We focus here on grave breaches of law in the context of international
armed conflict, 46 for which numerous international treaties contemplate
remedies. 47 First, states may not directly target civilians." For example, the
39. Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past Third ofa Century, 159
RECUEIL DES COURS 285-87 (1978) (noting that reparations are a state's legal responsibility under
international law for breaching an international obligation). To make things confusing, sometimes the
term "reparations" is used to mean cash payments for harms for activities lawful at the time, but now
understood to be wrong but judicially irremediable. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for
Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 691 (2003).
40. This compensation may be known as indemnity. Jimenez de Ar6chaga, supra note 39, at
286.
41. Frederic Megret, The International Criminal Court Statute and the Failure to Mention
Symbolic Reparation, 16 INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 127, 129 (2009).
42. Id. at 130.
43. See infra notes 84-87.
44. Though the means of doing so is "not unlimited." See Convention II, supra note 24, arts.
22, 23, 36.
45. GC for Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 21, art. 3.
46. While the scope of civilian protection in non-international armed conflict is not as fully
treated as it is in international armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol 11 provide similar protections and many states choose to provide more civilian
protections as a matter of policy.
47. See, e.g., GC for Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 21, art. 3; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court arts. 75(1)-(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("The Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation. . . . The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation."); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter First Additional Protocol] ("A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.").
48. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 47, art. 48. The Protocol also notes that "[tihe
civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protections against dangers arising from
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intentional killing of a village full of elderly men, women, and children-as
occurred in My Lai, Vietnam49-is prohibited.50 Second, while states may
target combatants or the narrow category of "civilians directly participating in
hostilities" for such time as they are participating, states may not engage in
actions expected to have excessive civilian casualties as weighed against any
direct and concrete military advantage.5 1 Combatants, for example, may not
carpet bomb a village of hundreds of civilians in order to kill one low-level
opposing combatant. These prohibitions are rooted in the IHL principle of
distinction, which directs combatants to respect and protect civilians by
distinguishing between civilian and military populations and directing attacks
only at military objectives. 52 In order to satisfy these rules, combatants must
behave reasonably. If a combatant makes a mistake as to a target or mistake as
to how much damage will ensue from the action, IHlL asks whether the
combatant took sufficient precautionary measures to avoid recklessly causing
harm. 3
States and combatants may also invoke a right to self-defense to justify
their use of force. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter governs the right of states to
engage in individual or collective self-defense with some state disagreement as
to what circumstances allow its invocation. Individual service members may
also invoke the right to self-defense. 54 Should such defense be improperly and
unreasonably invoked, however, reparations would be appropriate. In one
example, the International Court of Justice found that the United States violated
limitations on the use of force by mining Nicaraguan harbors, rejected the U.S.
claim to collective self-defense, and ordered the United States to pay
reparations.55
military operations" and forbids making civilians "the object of attack" and employing indiscriminate
attacks "which are not directed at a specific military objective" or "which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective." First Additional Protocol, supra note
47, arts. 51(l), (2), (4). While the United States has not ratified it, Article 51 has been understood to be
customary international law. See Fausto Pocar, To What Extent Is Protocol I Customary International
Law?, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 337, 346 (2002) (arguing that the general protection civilians are afforded
against dangers from military operations under Article 51 "reaffirms a general rule of international law
that has never been questioned despite being frequently disregarded in State practice").
49. See generally Alfred P. Rubin, Legal Aspects ofthe My Lai Incident, 49 OR. L. REV. 260,
261, 264 (1970) (discussing the United States' international obligations raised by the incident).
50. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
51. First Additional Protocol, supra note 47, arts. 51.5(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); Rome Statute, supra
note 47, art. 8(2)(b)(v).
52. First Additional Protocol, supra note 47, art. 48.
53. Id. arts. 57, 58.
54. Gary P. Coin, Should the Best Offense Ever Be a Good Defense? The Public Authority to
Use Force in Military Operations: Recalibrating the Use of Force Rules in the Standing Rules of
Engagement, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 20-21 (2016).
55. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). There is no state obligation to provide reparations for unlawful victims of
internal armed conflict. I JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 549 (2005). Nor is there an obligation or expectation for armed
groups to provide reparations. Ron Dudai, Closing the Gap: Symbolic Reparations and Armed Groups,
93 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 783, 785 (2011).
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1. Traditional Approach: No Individual Enforcement Rights
States have traditionally understood the international law obligation to
provide reparations for breaches of IHL as flowing from sovereign to
sovereign, not to individuals.56 In other words, individuals injured by a foreign
state must subordinate their claims to their state of citizenship,57 meaning that
an individual who is killed or wounded by foreign military forces would not
generally have a direct claim for compensation or non-repetition or satisfaction
under international law. Many states have been reluctant to view the
compensation provisions of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I as specifically creating individual rights.58
In particular, the United States does not recognize either the Hague or Geneva
Conventions as self-executing and thus precludes individuals from pursuing
reparations for violations of IHL.59
2. New Developments
While the traditional approach forecloses individually pursued claims for
reparations, states and international actors have innovated their approaches to
amends in a number of ways. First, the emergence of mass claims processing
holds some hope for victims of IHL violations seeking reparations. The earliest
such example was the U.N. Claims Commission (UNCC) for Iraq. In the wake
of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the U.N. Security Council passed
a resolution demanding that Iraq accept liability for all losses and injuries
resulting from the invasion.60 The Secretary General of the U.N. created a
compensation fund that provided lump sum payments to non-Iraqis injured
during the period of conflict. While some of the claimants might have suffered
lawful harm under IHL, the UNCC presumed that since the invasion was
unlawful, so too were any acts taken by Iraq during the conflict and that,
56. Paola Gaeta, Are Victims of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Entitled to Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 305, 308 (Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (citing Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment,
1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13)).
57. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 325-26 (4th ed. 1990);
Kenneth Bullock, United States Tort Liability for War Crimes Abroad: An Assessment and
Recommendation, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 144 (1995).
58. While Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907 ("[A] belligerent party which violates
the provisions ... shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.") and Article 91 of Protocol I might be
understood as creating an individual right to compensate for IHL violations, states have been reluctant to
accept this understanding. Convention II, supra note 24, art. 3; see Micaela Frulli, When Are States
Liable Towards Individuals for Serious Violations ofHumanitarian Law? The Marcovi6 Case, I J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 406, 409, 422-25 (2003) (discussing Italy's rejection of such a right but arguing in favor of
one); Toni Pfanner, Various Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian
Law and Protecting and Assisting War Victims, 91 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 279, 288-89 (2009); Elke
Schwager, The Right to Compensation for Victims ofan Arned Conflict, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 417, 438
(2005); Liesbeth Zevgeld, Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 85
INT'L REv. RED CROSS 497, 497 (2003); Liesbeth Zevgeld, Victims' Reparations Claims and
International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 79, 84 (2010).
59. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425-26 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
60. S.C. Res. 686, }2(b), U.N. Doe. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991).
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therefore, any damages resulting from the invasion and occupation were
eligible for compensation.61 Rather than assess all aspects of an individual
claim, the UJNCC used mass claims settlement techniques, including a
standardized damages schedule, to resolve over two million claims and award
more than eleven billion dollars in compensation. 62
Another prominent example of mass claims for IHL victims is the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC). This Commission allowed both Eritrea
and Ethiopia to act on behalf of their nationals to seek compensation for
violations of IHL stemming from their two-year border conflict.63 Notably, it
focused on "persistent and widespread patterns of misconduct, rather than
individual acts,"" and concluded that only violations of core rights from the
Geneva Conventions were compensable. 65 Somewhat dispiritingly, though, the
EECC found numerous violations, awarded damages, and helped develop the
approach to mass claims processing in this setting, neither state ultimately paid
any compensation to the other, leaving the victims uncompensated. 66
Second, the traditional view limiting reparation enforcement to states may
be eroding somewhat, such that IHL may now be more accepting of
individualized claims for reparations for harm arising out of unlawful foreign
state conduct. 67 For instance, several scholars now believe that customary
international law recognizes a responsibility to compensate individuals for
certain IHL violations. 68 In addition, the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, while non-binding, states that the obligation to protect,
respect, and implement IHL includes the duty to provide effective remedies,
including reparation, 69 to victims of unlawful state conduct.70 These reparations
61. Merritt B. Fox, Imposing Liability for Losses from Aggressive War: An Economic
Analysis of UN Compensation Commission, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 201, 202 (2002).
62. Linda Taylor, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in REPARATIONS FOR
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND
SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 198, 214 (Carla Ferstman & Alan Stephens eds., 2009); The Claims, U.N.
COMP. COMM'N, http://www.uncc.ch/claims (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
63. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and
the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eri.-Eth., arts. 5(1), (8), (9), Dec. 12, 2000, 40 1.L.M. 260.
64. Eritrea's Civilians Claims 15, 16, 23 and 27-32, Partial Award, 26 R.1.AA. 195, 213 (Eri.
Eth. Cl. Comm'n 2004).
65. Ethiopia's Damages Claims, Final Award, 26 R.I.A.A. 631, 715-16, 747 (Eri. Eth. Cl.
Comm'n 2009).
66. SEAN D. MURPHY ET AL., LITIGATING WAR: MASS CIVILIAN INJURIES AND THE ERITREAN
ETHIOPIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 93-94 (2013).
67. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 55.
68. Roger Alford, Recent Books on International Law, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 234, 238 (2015)
(reviewing MURPHY ET AL., supra note 66 (concluding that the authors "suggest[] that international law
requires compensation for jus ad bellum and jus in bello violations")); Gaeta, supra note 56, at 308;
Comm. on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, Int'l L. Ass'n, The Hague Conference on
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, 14-19 (2010) (noting that the new dominant position in the
literature, and perhaps in practice as well, is that IHL does provide an individual right to reparation).
69. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex at art. 3(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
70. G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 69, at Annex ¶M 15-23.
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are to be "adequate, effective and prompt," given with the intent to "promote
justice," and "include compensation for any economically assessable
damage."" Appropriate remedies might include measures aimed at the
cessation of continuing violations; verification and public disclosure of the
facts; a declaration restoring the dignity of the victim; and public apology,
including acknowledgement of the facts, acceptance of responsibility, 72 and
guarantees of non-repetition.73
Some courts are now providing access for individuals to seek reparations.
For instance, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
created a trust fund for victims of crimes within the court's jurisdiction, which
encompasses war crimes. 74 This is the first international criminal tribunal to
allow victims to directly pursue reparations 75 from individual perpetrators."
The ICC statute focuses on compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation,
mentioning neither satisfaction nor non-repetition as possible reparative
measures. 77 The ICC has now issued reparations for the conscription and use of
children in armed hostilities78 and is considering them for war crimes in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.7 9 While the United States is not subject to
the ICC's jurisdiction,so the ICC's recognition of individual claims for
reparations may signal the growing acceptance of such claims among the
international community.8' For instance, several countries have passed
legislation allowing for individual compensation for the war crime of rape8 2
71. Id. M 15, 20.
72. See id. % 22(a), (b), (d), (e).
73. See id. $ 23.
74. Rome Statute, supra note 47.
75. See id. art. 75(1).
76. Id. arts. 75, 79; David Donat-Cattin, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 75, n. I (Otto Triffterer, ed., 1999); Nancy Armoury Combs, From Prosecutorial to
Reparatory: A Valuable Post-Conflict Change ofFocus, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 219, 241 (2015).
77. Megret, supra note 41, at 133.
78. ICC Press Release, Trust Fund for Victims Welcomes First ICC Reparations Decision,
Ready to Engage, ICC-CPI-20120808-PR832 (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx
?name=pr832.
79. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Order Instructing the Parties and
Participants to File Observations in Respect of the Reparations Proceedings (Apr. 1, 2015).
80. The United States has not ratified and is not a party to the Rome Statute. International
Criminal Court, U.S. DEP'T STATE (2010), http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/icc.
81. While the ECCC does not allow individual monetary reparations to victims, it has adapted
the civil party participation system to allow victims to seek collective and moral reparations.
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev. 3), Rules 23, 100(2), 110(3),
113(1) Internal Rules of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Rev. 3) as revised on Mar.
6, 2009.
82. Kosovo and Croatia have recently passed legislation including compensation for women
raped during war. Darko Bandic, Croatian Lawmakers Approved Law That Compensates Rape Victims
from War in 1990s, U.S.N.W.R. (May 29, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/05
/29/croatia-passes-law-compensating-rape-victims-from-1 990s-war. Libya has passed similar
legislation. Zoe Schlanger, Libya Set to Pay Reparations to Victims of Rape as a War Crime,
NEWSWEEK (June 12, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/Iibya-set-pay-reparations-victims-rape-war-
crime-254717.
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with Bosnian courts granting compensation to rape victims as part of domestic
criminal prosecutions of war criminals.83
3. The "Unlawfulness" Limitation on Reparations
These innovations in reparations expand access to individual claimants,
but they do not directly benefit victims of lawful harm. By definition,
reparations are not currently understood to encompass victims of state behavior
who have suffered no legal violation. 84 In drafting the Articles on State
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts,85 for instance, the
International Law Commission found the term "wrongful" to be understood to
mean unlawful, not simply harmful.86 Relatedly, those provisions of IHL that
contemplate remedies, such as Article 3 of the Hague Convention and Article
91 of Additional Protocol I are expressly limited to legal violations. Those
courts willing to entertain individual claims for compensation have followed
suit and have limited them to violations of IHL.87
This limitation is a meaningful one as IHIL permits the death of innocent
civilians in two broad categories. First, IHL allows collateral damage or the
incidental loss of civilian life when it is not excessive given the "concrete and
83. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Court Grants Compensation to War Crimes Victim, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/europe/bosnia-herzegovina-court-grants-
compensation-to-war-crimes-victim.html; see also Julian Borger, Bosnian Rape Victims May Claim
Compensation for the First Time, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2015/jun/30/bosnia-victims-compensation-landmark-ruling (describing a second case in which
compensation was awarded to war crime victims).
84. Pfanner, supra note 58, at 290.
85. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
86. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
Commentaries, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N pt. 2, 31 (2001) (noting that "[t]he articles deal only with the
responsibility for conduct which is internationally wrongful. There may be cases where States incur
obligations to compensate for the injurious consequences of conduct which is not prohibited and may
even be expressly permitted, by international law . . . . These requirements of compensation or
restoration would involve primary obligations . . . . Thus for the purposes of these articles, international
responsibility results exclusively from a wrongful act contrary to international law."); ALPHONSE
MULEEFU, REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE: A NORMATIVE AND THEORETICAL
INQUIRY 131 (2014). While the 1973 Special Rapporteur on state responsibility acknowledged that
states might hypothetically be responsible also for internationally lawful acts, Introduction by the
Special Rapporteur, [1993] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977, the ILC decided
not to address such acts in a comprehensive fashion. Instead, it has crafted other draft articles reflecting
strict liability in discrete areas like transboundary harms from hazardous activities. See Int'l Law
Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 at 106-182 (2006); Int'l Law
Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
87. BVerfG, 2Bvr 2660/06 - 2BvR 487/07, Aug. 13, 2013, http://www.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2013/08/rk20130813_2bvr266006.htmi (rejecting a
constitutional claim for compensation arising out of a 2009 airstrike, concluding the German colonel
that ordered the strike did not violate the laws of war); GHAMS 06 juli 2000, NJ 2003, 759/99 m.nt. Skh
(Dedovic/Kok) (Neth.), http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2000:A00070
(ruling by a Dutch court that (HL does not provide a remedy for persons who suffer from air strikes but
have not personally suffered an IHL rule or norm violation); Carla Bleiker, Appeal by Kunduz Airstrike
Victims' Families Fails, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/appeal-by-kunduz-
airstrike-victims-families-fails/a-18420262; Sabrina Toppa, Yemeni Drone Victims Still Waiting for
Accountability, WARSCAPES (May 17, 2016), http://www.warseapes.com/opinion/yemeni-drone-
victims-still-waiting-accountability.
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direct military advantage anticipated." 8 In other words, if a military target is
important enough, then anticipated civilian deaths, perhaps even extensive
civilian deaths,89 are allowed. Proceeding with an attack given mere awareness
of the risk of civilian deaths is not a per se violation of IHL.90 If troops seek to
engage, for example, in a bombing raid of a high value military site, the
presence of civilians who will be killed does not automatically render the strike
unlawful.
Second, IHL permits reasonable mistakes9 ' that may result in civilian
casualties. For instance, if a commander takes sufficient precautions to verify a
target's identity and classification as a legitimate target,92 but is mistaken and
the target turns out to be an innocent civilian, the death of the civilian is lawful.
Likewise, if a commander complies with requirements related to identifying a
legal target, but is still reasonably unaware of the presence of civilians, civilian
deaths resulting from attacks on the target are similarly lawful.
In those circumstances that involve the military's invocation of self-
defense, whether at a national, unit, or individual level, a reasonable invocation
is a lawful one. So, for instance, either an actual imminent threat or a
reasonable belief that an imminent threat exists would be sufficient to
immunize an action. To take one example, if a state actor reasonably believed
that a civilian at a check-point outside active hostilities presented an immediate
threat because the civilian appeared to be reaching for a weapon, the state
would not be liable for reparations even if it turned out the civilian was
unarmed.
In sum, IHL currently contains no requirement for compensation,
responsibility-taking, or apologies for those civilians who are affected by
lawful combat activities. Nor, at this time, are such responses an emerging
norm.93 While several scholars have focused on the need to provide
88. First Additional Protocol, supra note 47, art. 51(5)(b).
89. See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part II)?: The
"Proportionality" Principle Under International Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 143, 152-53
(2011) (arguing Protocol I does not mandate proportionality between the expected civilian loss and "the
extent of casualties and other damage inflicted by the enemy's assault," but rather that the former is not
'excessive,' relative to "the 'military advantage anticipated."').
90. While some courts may be beginning to challenge this understanding of IHL, the United
States continues to hold this view. See Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept ofIntent, 35 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 79, 89-90 (2013).
91. It is worth noting the difficulties that military personnel, like other decision makers, are
likely to have in determining whether a particular act was justified or proportional, including
complications related to confirmation bias, self-serving bias, in-group effects, and other psychological
phenomena. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERtE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW(2016) (discussing the difficulty people have in assessing risks and making judgments of
"reasonableness"). On the difficulties of these assessments, see also Gregory D. Johnsen, Nothing Says
"Sorry Our Drones Hit Your Wedding Party" Like $800,000 and Some Guns, BuzzFEED (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.buzzfeed
.com/gregorydjohnsen/wedding-party-drone-strike.
92. First Additional Protocol, supra note 47, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
93. Sophie van Dijken et al., Monetary Payments for Civilian Harm in International and
National Practice, CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT 11-31 (Oct. 2013),
http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/ValuationFinalOct_2013pdf.pdf (providing a
comprehensive listing of the few states providing payments).
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compensation to victims of lawful harm during armed conflict,94 the
international community is not yet ready to transform such need into an
obligation to provide reparations.95 Indeed, the Center for Civilians in Conflict
(CIVIC), the nongovernmental organization that has spearheaded the campaign
for international law to demand amends for all war victims, seems to have
reoriented toward other ways to attend to civilian needs. To the extent that the
organization has still emphasized mandatory compensation, such efforts were
largely aimed at the United States prior to President Obama's Executive Order
on civilian casualties. 96 Given the ongoing difficulties in getting states to
recognize the need for reparations for unlawful victims, 97 we think arguing for
such an international obligation for lawful victims might be putting the cart
well ahead of the horse. 98 We are not per se hostile to such an obligation, but
one might more readily persuade states such as the United States, who already
have condolence and solatia programs, to adopt amends programs without the
additional overlay of binding international law obligations.
Instead, we suggest that encouraging voluntary adoption of domestic
amends programs might in turn lay the groundwork for a norm shift. Amends
fit with emerging international and domestic practices to respect the needs of
those adversely affected by human rights abuses and armed conflicts. For
instance, our call for information regarding the events surrounding a civilian
casualty stems from the same spirit as the newly emerging right to truth in the
94. MULEEFU, supra note 86, at 131; Ronen, supra note 38, at 12; Minako Ichikawa Smart,
Compensation for Civilian Casualties in Armed Conflict and Theory of Liability, in ECONOMICS OF
WAR AND PEACE: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 243, 243-59 (Benjamin E.
Goldsmith & Jurgen Brauer eds., 2010); Sarah Holewinski, Do Less Harm: Protecting and
Compensating Civilians in War, 92 FOREIGN AFFS. 14 (2013).
95. For instance, the International Law Association in considering reparations for victims of
armed conflict noted that "the right to reparation - in whatever form - presupposes a violation of
international law." Rainer Hofmann, Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation
for Victims ofArmed Conflict, reprinted in THE HAGUE CONFERENCE (2010): REPARATION FOR VICTIMS
OF ARMED CONFLICT, INT'L L. Ass'N, art. 3, cmt. 1, at 6 (2010). Yet it left the door open to such an
obligation when it theorized that "incidental losses might be caused by lawful conduct according to the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, given that not every injury to civilians constitutes
a violation of international law. It is as yet unclear whether a right to reparation is triggered in such a
situation. Care should be taken not to render the distinction between lawful and unlawful conduct
meaningless. The fact that victims may be entitled to reparation for harm caused by lawful conduct does
not mean that responsible parties are to be equally liable for consequences of lawful and unlawful
conduct." Id. art. 4, cmt. 3, at 9.
96. See CIVIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 9-14 (2016) (mentioning compensation in Annual
Report only for victims of the U.S. military in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan).
97. The vast majority of states do not provide monetary payments for any type of civilian
harm in armed conflict. Menno T. Kamminga, Towards a Permanent International Claims Commission
for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 23, 25
(2007) (noting that the adoption of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law has not led to much change in domestic practices regarding
individual requests for reparations); van Dijken et al., supra note 93, at 11-31 (providing a
comprehensive listing of the few states providing payments).
98. This may be particularly so given the President-Elect's vocal disdain for the existing legal
limitations of the Geneva Conventions. See Spencer Ackerman, Trump Attack on Geneva Conventions
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human rights context."9 Yet it considers the need for truth within the existing
IHL framework that approaches human rights concerns, such as the right to life
and the right to human dignity, with the notion that such rights flow from a
state which maintains the authority to use force and thus possesses the ability to
abridge or limit those human rights in times of armed conflict.'" Our proposed
amends fit with this notion of IiHL as a compromise: an imperfect system which
generally provides protections to noncombatants and some dignity to
combatants in return for shielding the "essence of war," that is, killing and
confining combatants without due process.10 ' As we demonstrate in Part II,
amends making simply expands upon how the notion of dignity and humanity
might be fulfilled in a setting that permits the lawful killing of civilians.
Tables 1 and 2 highlight the difference between existing individual
reparations and our proposed amends making approach.






For grave IHL breaches? Yes Yes
To individuals for grave IHL Yes No
breaches?
To individuals for lawful, but No No
awful IHL harms?
Table 2: Recent Payment Practices for
Conflicts
Harmdoing During Armed





99. See generally Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the
Right to Truth: Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 1 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8,
2006) (concluding the right to truth might be invoked for grave breaches of IHL as well as gross
violations of human rights). The right to truth, often invoked in response to enforced disappearances,
"implies knowing the full and complete truth as to the events that transpired, their specific
circumstances, and who participated in them, including knowing the circumstances in which the
violations took place, as well as the reasons for them." Id. 13.
100. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States To Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1621
(1984); Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. REV. 259 (1989).
101. Christopher Kutz, The Diference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law
and War, 33 PHIL. & PuB. AFFS. 148, 166 (2005) (quoting Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for
International Humanitarian Law: Challenges From the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD
AFFS. 55, 57).
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B. Domestic Provision of Condolence and Solatia
As we have seen so far, international law does not require individualized
amends for military conduct abroad. In addition to general sovereign immunity
principles precluding suits against states,1 02 friendly visiting armed forces often
negotiate status of forces agreements that often explicitly provide immunity for
both criminal prosecutions and civil suits related to their non-combat
activities.' 03 Under such agreements, neither recognition of wrongdoing nor
compensation is required from the armed forces for harmdoing.' The United
102. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1847).
103. HAZEL Fox & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 593 (3d ed. 2013); Final
Report on Status of Forces Agreements, U.S. DEP'T STATE 5, 13, 16, 19 (2015),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf. Even when the United States cannot get
immunity, it may seek concurrent jurisdiction in which it will usually secure jurisdiction in individual
cases. Id. at 17-18.
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States, and many other states, 0 however, have created domestic mechanisms
to compensate for the harm they cause.' 06 We look here at how U.S. statutes
and military programs provide for payments in both the non-combat and
combat settings.
1. Non-combat activities
Acts taken during armed conflict in a foreign country are outside the
general scope of U.S. tort law. While Congress created the Federal Torts
Claims Act to overcome sovereign immunity regarding torts committed by
persons acting on behalf of the United States, the Act specifically excludes both
"any claim arising in a foreign country"0 7 and "any claim arising out of the
combatant activities of the military ... during time of war." 08
Under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), however, the United States
voluntarily allows claims for compensation against its armed forces acting
abroad when they engage in tortious non-combat activity.0 9 Congress initially
enacted the statute with the purpose of "maintaining and promoting friendly
relations" with other countries," 0 though the process has since been made
available in countries that might not be considered allies."' If the United States
chooses to create a Foreign Claims Commission (FCC) in another country
where it has armed forces, then local individuals may bring claims against the
U.S. government for injuries incurred during non-combat activities." 2 Such
claims are cognizable only if the underlying act or omission causing an injury
is "considered negligent or wrongful."" 3 The paradigmatic example is an
American service member stationed in France who tortuously injures a French
civilian in an automobile accident while driving on an official, but non-combat-
related mission." 4 In theory, an FCC, comprised of military officers or other
105. Sarah Holewinski, Making Amends: A New Expectation for Civilian Losses in Armed
Conflict, in CIVILIANS AND MODERN WAR: ARMED CONFLICT AND THE IDEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 317,
324-25 (Daniel Rothbart et al. eds., 2012).
106. At least one state, Iraq, has passed a national compensation law that allows payments for
death or injuries caused by military errors and operations. Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples
to Self-Determination, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/32/Add.4 (Aug. 12, 2011).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2012).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2012).
109. Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2012). Some have argued for the extension of
the FCA for criminal acts occurring during armed conflict. Bullock, supra note 57, at 157-58.
110. Bullock, supra note 57, at 157-58.
111. John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1455, 1468 (2008) (discussing implementation of FCA claims system in the Vietnam
War).
112. Id.
113. U.S. DEP'T ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-162, CLAIMS PROCEDURES 10-3(c)(1) (2008),
http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/p27l162/main.asp#chl0. So, for instance, the Yangju highway
incident in which a U.S. military officer killed two Korean school girls while driving a tank on a civilian
road for a military exercise would likely not be eligible for an FCA claim as the driver was found not to
be at fault (albeit in a criminal proceeding). Yoon Jeong Huh, The Staying Power ofPersonal Contact in
the South Korean Public Diplomacy, in THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: CONFRONTNG
CHALLENGES AHEAD 109, 109-10 (William A. Hugh ed., 2011).
114. For a recent example, see Helene Cooper, Vehicle in Convoy of US. Ambassador to UN.
Kills Boy in Cameroon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/world
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employees of the armed forces, would evaluate such a claim according to local
tort law."1 5 Claims above $10,000 require additional approval and the statute
caps payouts at $100,000.116 The process includes an investigation of the facts
with claimant and witness interviews, assessment of documents," as well as a
determination of the applicable law and, where relevant, an acknowledgement
of responsibility." 18
This may initially seem similar to the resolution of domestic tort cases. In
many respects, however, the administration of the FCA has more in common
with the voluntary payments systems described below than with a judicial
resolution."' Notably, both the creation of the FCC and the decision to award
compensation in any individual claim is discretionary. In addition, the "law"
applied does not seem to closely mirror local custom and excludes some claims
and damages that would be allowed under local tort law.120 Awards tend to
cluster within a given range-a range that is significantly lower than what the
statute allows.' 2 ' And interestingly, wrongful death claims are exceptionally
rare under the FCA.1 22
In rare instances, the United States has offered amends in the absence of a
legal finding of wrongdoing. In perhaps the most notable example, a U.S.
military officer accidentally ran over two high school girls while conducting a
peacetime military training exercise in South Korea.1 23 For many reasons,
including a failure to quickly apologize, the incident sparked massive protests
against the United States' presence in South Korea. The United States
/africa/vehicle-in-convoy-of-samantha-power-kills-boy-in-cameroon.html?_r-0, which discusses an
incident in which U.S. Ambassador Samantha Powers' motorcade ran over a child in Cameroon.
115. U.S. DEP'T ARMY, Reg. 27-20, CLAIMS 52 (2008) [hereinafter AR 27-20] ("In
determining an appropriate award, the law and custom of the country in which the incident occurred will
be applied to determine which elements of damages are payable and which individuals are entitled to
compensation.").
116. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2002). Meritorious claims above $100,000 may be reported to the
Secretary of Treasury for payment.
117. Rochelle M. Howard, Foreign Claims Training 18-30 (2009),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documenteloud.org/documents/ 1674171 /fcc-training-oct-09.pdf.
118. Jon Tracy, Sometimes in War, You Can Put a Price on Life, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/opinion/16tracy.html (claiming that "[o]fficial compensation under
the Foreign Claims Act acknowledges wrongdoing").
119. Witt, supra note 111, at 1466. The FCA does not mandate that a payment be made at all,
even if the claim is meritorious. Instead, claim payment is left entirely to the discretion of the FCCs.
Witt weighs these facts and determines that "[d]espite its legal armature, the FCA is instead a system of
administrative authority exercised at the discretion of American armed forces." Id.
120. Id. at 1465.
121. For instance, during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the FCCs capped wrongful death
claims at $10,000 in an attempt to match local custom. FREDERIC BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN
COMBAT: ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI 212 (2001). However,
most claims paid were between $3,000 and $5,000 per individual. Id. at 225. In Operation Uphold
Democracy, U.S. forces found the Haitian legal system's calculation of wrongful death damages too
perplexing and ultimately allowed a range of $5,000 to $14,000. Id. at 253. More recently, between 2003
and 2006, FCCs paid out about $4,200 per death claim in Iraq and Afghanistan. American Civil
Liberties Union, Documents Received from the Department of the Army in Response to ACLU FOA
Request 837-39 (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/log.html [hereinafter FOI Documents].
122. Tracy, supra note 118.
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ultimately responded with a new strategy to "apologize first and determine the
details later," 24 multiple efforts to minimize the risk of a similar incident,125 on
the spot compensation for military harms,1 26 and ongoing amends, with
members of the responsible infantry division helping the affected families with
their planting every year.1 27
2. Combat activities and use offorce outside areas of active
hostilities
For civilian victims of combat activities during armed conflict, the United
States similarly provides no judicially mandated remedy.1 28 While the Federal
Torts Claims Act waives the government's immunity for tortious activities, it
excludes combatant activities during times of war and claims arising out of acts
in places not subject to U.S. sovereignty.1 29 Nor does a finding of criminal
liability trigger any mandatory financial payments to the victims. 3 0 Even if one
124. Erik Slavin, Errant Shell Puts U.S. Military's Lessons Learned in Korea To the Test,
STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 3, 2005), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/errant-shell-puts-us-military-s-
lessons-learned-in-korea-to-the-test-1.338245 (suggesting that lessons learned from the Yangju
Highway incident have led to quick responses to similar subsequent incidents, such as when the military
responded to the harm caused by an errant training round by sending "a two-star general .. . to the
village to make amends, [and] the army cut a check for the homeowner's inconvenience on the spot,
while South Korean soldiers fixed the roof'). More generally, the United States seems to be much
quicker to apologize for harms caused by the U.S. military, whether lawful or not, since the incident. Jon
Rabiroff & Yoo Kyong Chang, U.S. Military Makes Partial Apology for S. Korea Subway Incident,
STARS & STRIPES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/korea/us-military-makes-partial-
apology-for-s-korea-subway-incident-1.206871 (noting the recent trend of "U.S. commanders in South
Korea ... making apologies immediately after alleged wrongdoing by servicemembers").
125. Slavin, supra note 124.
126. Id.; see also Erik Slavin, Army Suspends Rodriguez Range Operations as Errant Shell
Inquiry Continues, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/army-
suspends-rodriguez-range-operations-as-errant-shell-inquiry-continues- 1.338244.
127. Erik Slavin, 2nd ID Hasn't Forgotten Family of Girl Killed by Military Vehicle, STARS &
STRIPES (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.stripes.com/news/2nd-id-hasn-t-forgotten-family-of-girl-killed-by-
military-vehicle-1.55778.
128. Bullock, supra note 57, at 126. Nor would a family be able to pursue a tort claim in the
domestic courts where the civilian casualty occurred as states have sovereign immunity in foreign
courts. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 325-36.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2680() (2012).
130. For instance, the U.S. military provided $2000 to each of the families of those
intentionally killed by Sargent Bales during the Kandahar massacre in Afghanistan and informed them
that the compensation was wholly independent of any outcome at trial. Matthew Rosenberg & Sanghar
Rahiri, US. Pays Families of Afghan Victims in Massacre by Soldier, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/asialus-compensates-afghan-villagers-for-soldiers-
attack.html (reporting also that families of Afghan victims received Afghan government payments of
$2,000). In a similar incident, the U.S. military offered the victims of a shooting in Haditha $2,500 per
family member killed. Nick Broomfield, For the Families of Haditha, This Is a Matter of Honor,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/13/bush-my-lai-
haditha-massacre-fund. No apology or additional offer of compensation was made even after a guilty
plea in the criminal case. Raheem Salman & Patrick J. McDonnell, In Iraq, Haditha Case is Reminder of
Justice Denied, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/25/world/la-fg-iraq-
haditha-20120125. The family members slain by Afghanistan's kill team received no compensation and
it seems as though they were expected to submit the same claim as those with lawfully killed relatives.
Lesley Wexler, The Vietnamization of the Long War on Terror: An Ongoing Lesson in International
Humanitarian Law Non-Compliance, 30 B. U. INT'L L. J. 575, 582 (2012); Jason Motlagh, Afghanistan:
Victims'Families Denounce 'U.S. Kill Team,' TIME (Oct. 12, 2010), http://content.time.com/time
/nation/article/0,8599,2025091,00.html.
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could find a substantive law that could plausibly be read to provide some
remedy to victims, American courts often decline to reach the substance of
these matters on justiciability grounds.'31
Moreover, attempts to force the government to provide information on
individual drone strikes have been largely unavailing. For instance, none of the
suits surrounding the targeting of Yemeni cleric and high level al Qaeda
operative, Anwar al-Awlaki, yielded much new information about the
controversial strike itself and they were all dismissed on justiciability
grounds.1 32 Nor is a suit regarding the Yemeni civilian casualties incurred in
the same strike that killed Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto likely to
succeed.1 33 Most recently, a federal appeals court dismissed an ACLU suit
seeking specific statistics on drone strikes, including details about civilian
casualties, concluding such information could reasonably be expected to
damage national security.1 34 While such litigation might have motivated
President Obama to release information about civilian casualties in
counterterrorism strikes in areas outside of active hostilities, such information
was not disaggregated and provided no details about individual strikes. 135
Instead, the United States employs ex gratia practices for victims of
armed conflict known as solatia or condolence payments. Solatia payments are
distinct from foreign claims as they are discretionary payments given "in
accordance with local custom as an expression of sympathy toward a victim or
his or her Family." 36 Condolence payments are understood a bit more broadly
as they "can be paid to express sympathy and to provide urgent humanitarian
relief' to individual victims or to the relevant community. Like solatia
payments, condolence payments are "different from claims and are not an
admission of fault" by the United States and are "not an acknowledgement of
any moral or legal responsibility for someone's death, injury, or damaged
property. Condolence payments are symbolic gestures and are not paid to
compensate someone for a loss." 37
131. Lesley Wexler, The Role of the Judicial Branch during the Long War: Drone Courts,
Damage Suits, and FOIA Requests, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL
AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES (Derek Jinks ed., 2014) (noting the courts are, however, more willing to
provide information about the legal architecture governing drone strikes); see also Declaration of John
Bradford Wiegmann at 9, ACLU v. Dep't of Justice (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2015) (No. 1: 15-cv-0 1954-CM).
132. Lesley Wexler, Litigating the Long War on Terror: The Role ofal-Aulaqi v. Obama, 159
Loy. INT'L L. REV. 159, 166 (2011).
133. Scott Shane, Families of Drone Strike Victims in Yemen File Suit in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/families-of-drone-strike-
victims-in-yemen-file-suit-in-washington.html; Why is Obama Trying to Kick Drone Strike Victims Out
of U.S. Courts, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/why-is-obama-trying-to-kick-drone-strike-
victims-out-of-us-courts/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
134. ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 690 Fed. Appx. 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
135. Summary of Information Regarding U. S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of
Active Hostilities, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (July 1, 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI+Release+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.P
DF [hereinafter Summary ofInformation].
136. AR 27-20, supra note 115, at 55 (identifying the Federated States of Micronesia, Japan,
Korea, and Thailand as countries with solatia payment custom).
137. See MAAWS-A, supra note 35, at 13-14; see also U.S. Military to Train Iraq Troops in
Values, NPR (June 2, 2006, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?
1432017]
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Until quite recently, in countries where the United States has not
acknowledged its use of military force, it did not formally offer condolence or
solatia payments to civilians affected by combat operations, though it might
funnel payments to civilians through the local government. For instance, when
the United States has engaged in unacknowledged drone strikes in Pakistan, it
has had no formal program for solatia payments,' but has created a conflict
victims support program to assist local governments in Pakistan.139 This U.S.-
initiated program helped to develop a mechanism to provide payments to
victims of terrorism,'4 0 including those killed in military operations.141 By
2011, the program was being applied in an ad hoc way to civilian victims of
drone strikes.1 42 Similarly, the Defense Department has not acknowledged its
role in drone activity in Yemen and Somalia and has denied making solatia
payments there.1 43 But some suspect that local government payments made to
victims' families have been funded by the United States,'" including in such
high-profile examples as the payment of $750,000 and 105 rifles to members of
a Yemeni wedding party for a strike that killed 12 individualsl45 and the
payment of $55,000 to Yemeni families following an Easter weekend drone
strike.' 46 This may have changed since President Obama's July 1 Executive
Order directed agencies "as appropriate and consistent with mission objectives"
to offer payments in "U.S. operations involving the use of force in armed
conflict or in the exercise of the Nation's inherent right of self-defense." 47 Yet
the flexible nature of this directive and the pending change in the
storyid=5446623 (interviewing Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli).
138. See NETA CRAWFORD, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLING: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN AMERICA'S POST-9/11 WARS 374 (2013).
139. See Conflict Victims' Support Program in Pakistan, DEVEX (Mar. 7, 2012),
https://www.devex.com/projects/grants/conflict-victims-support-program-in-pakistan/2167.
140. Civilian Victims Support Program Newsletter, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. (Mar. 2015),
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=forums&srcid=MTMxNTIwMDYyNjQyMDgxNDQMjkB
MDU2NDI4MDMyMzII MjY I MDkxNzgBZzJwZGg2cDVIUndKATAuMQEBdjI.
141. DEVEX,supra note 139.
142. Press Release, Center for Civilians in Conflict, Pakistan: Compensation Promised to
Civilian Drone Victims (Mar. 28, 2011), http://civiliansinconflict.org/resources/pr/pakistan-
compensation-promised-to-civilian-drone-victims; see also Drone Attack: Victims' families to get
Rso.3m each, EXPRESS TRIB. (Mar. 26, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/138047/pakistan-to-
compensate-us-drone-strike-families-official/.
143. Currier, supra note 19.
144. See Greg Miller, Yemeni Victims of U.S. Military Drone Strike Get More than $1 Million
in Compensation, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/yemeni-victims-of-us-military-drone-strike-get-more-than-I million-in-
compensation/2014/08/18/670926f0-26e4-1e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html; see also Chris Woods,
Analysis: Holding U.S. to Account for Civilian Drone Deaths in Yemen, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/07/holding-the-us-to-
account-for-civilian-drone-deaths-in-yemen/.
145. Johnsen, supra note 91.
146. Press Release, Yemeni Government Pays out $55k to Civilian Victims of Easter Drone
Strikes, REPRIEVE (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2014_0423_pub-yemeni
-government dronesvictims.
147. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, § 2. Of course, the question here is whether future
administrations will find that such payments are consistent with mission objectives in areas where the
United States wants to downplay its involvement. That said, the Executive Order's mandate of an annual
report of civilian casualties in areas outside active hostilities already cuts against some of the secrecy
concerns that might arise in such settings.
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Administration makes it hard to predict whether such payments will become
standard practice. 14 8
The U.S. military's post-9/11 activities have resulted in a significant
number of civilian deaths. 149 While some contest the applicability of the IHL
framework to particular U.S. activities in the war on terror, the United States
itself claims that it is bound by and abides by these rules when engaging in
activities such as ground fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as when
making drone strikes in these and other locations.' The United States often
prefers this body of law as it contemplates the possibility of lawful civilian
deaths by acknowledging the use of force and not criminalizing certain types of
civilian casualties.
The approaches that the United States takes to responding to civilian
deaths are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 3.
Figure 1: Legal Framework for State Harmdoing
Yes- Foreign Claims
Was there Act payment
a violation
Noncombat - of tort
/ law? No- Loss falls on
Did the state victim
killing of an
innocent
occur in a Criminal
combat or punishment +
noncombat Was there - Yes reparations






148. Knuckey, supra note 31 (noting concern about the carve-out language).
149. For a discussion of various counts and methodology issues, see Neta C. Crawford,
Assessing the Human Toll of the Post 9/11 Wars: The Dead and Wounded in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan, 2001-2011 (Mar. 2015), http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians. The
United States itself acknowledges between 64 and 116 civilian deaths from U.S. attacks against terrorists
in areas outside active hostilities between 2009 and 2015. See sources cited supra note 135.
150. Lesley Wexler, International Humanitarian Law Divergence, 42 PEPP. L. REv. 102, 106
(2015) ("[T]he Obama administration has publicized a basic legal framework that describes the United
States as being in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda governed by IHL.").
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Table 3: Payments Offered when US. Armed Forces Kill Foreign Civilians
LEGAL LEGAL EXAMPLES OUTCOME
SETTING STATUS
Noncombat Conduct U.S. military negligently runs Eligible for FCC
violates over French civilian during payment
(Tort law) local tort noncombat missioni51
law
Conduct U.S. military non-negligently Loss usually falls on
does not runs over South Korean civilian victim
violate local during noncombat mission 52  Discretionary
tort law
payments and ad hoc
amends possible
U.S. military targets and kills















151. Major William R. Mullins, The International Responsibility of a State for Torts of Its
Military Forces, 34 MIL. L. REv. 59, 63 (1966) (describing purpose of precursor FCA as being to defuse
tensions arising out of damage claims raised by French civilians).
152. Jinwung Kim, Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States
Forces Korea (USFK), 30 ASIAN AFF. 268, 278 (2004) (describing public backlash to the lack of a
criminal finding for the Yangju Highway incident).
153. See e.g., Wexler, supra note 130, at 576-82.
154. We were unable to locate a domestic judicial proceeding holding an attack to be
disproportionate.
155. United States v. Behenna, 71 M.J. 228 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (upholding conviction for the
shooting and killing of a detainee during an unauthorized interrogation and concluding that defendant
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Conduct U.S. military satisfies Status quo: Eligible
does not proportionality but knowingly for condolence or
violate causes death of civilians as solatia payment
international collateral damage1 56
or U.S.
o U.S. military makes reasonable
criminal aw mistake of fact about civilians' Status quo: Rare ad
status and targets them157  hoc amends
U.S. military makes reasonable
mistake of fact about need to
exercise self-defense158  Proposed: Amends
U.S. military takes required for all in this
precautions but unintentionally category
kills civilians while targeting
combatants' 59
3. Process
Financial payments made as a result of injuries caused by either combat
or non-combat activities generally go through the same early stage processing.
Soldiers may seek out surviving family members following an operation,
particularly when they do not anticipate "armed resistance."l 60 Sometimes they
leave cards that explain how families can make claims. In other instances the
victims must act on their own accord to bring their claims. 161 In Iraq, for
156. William Branigin & Debbi Wilgoren, Zarqawi Did Not Die Instantly, U.S. General Says,
WASH. POST (June 9, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/technology
/2006/06/09/zarqawi-did-not-die-instantly-us-general-says/4c35fl 29-b590-4el 7-8313-ccbeb0f01db l/
(describing the strike on Zarqawi that killed five others as "very appropriate and proportional to the fact
that Zarqawi is the number one terrorist in Iraq").
157. LAURA KASINOF, DON'T BE AFRAID OF THE BULLETS: AN ACCIDENTAL WAR
CORRESPONDENT IN YEMEN 260 (2014) (suggesting that the targeting of Abduiraham al-Awlaki may
have been a case of mistaken identity).
158. Suzanne Goldenberg & Michael Howard, U.S. Military Backs Marine over Filmed
Falluja Mosque Shooting, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2005), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/may/06
/iraq.michaelhoward (reporting that in an analogous situation the United States had declined court
martial charges after an investigation concluded that the the defendant believed a wounded man was
committing a hostile act and thus lawfully invoked the right to self-defense).
159. See, e.g., Nick Baumann, The American Teen Whose Death-by-Drone Obama Won't
Explain, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-
drum/2015/04/abdulrahman-al-awlaki-obama-drone (describing the Administration's position that the
attack that killed Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, son of Anwar al-Awlaki, was not specifically targeting the
victim); Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Obama, in a Shit, to Limit Targets ofDrone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/us/us-acknowledges-killing-4-americans-in-
drone-strikes.html.
160. Jason Lyall et al., Explaining Support for Combatants During Wartime: A Survey
Experiment in Afghanistan, 107 AM. POL. SC. REv. 679, 693 (2013).
161. Currier, supra note 19; ROGERS, supra note 19, at 4. This is true with regard to amends
payments made by the United States as well as those made by other countries. Id. at 8 ("The U.K.
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example, individuals could make claims at Civilian Military Action Centers
located in various neighborhoods, an Iraqi Assistance Center in Baghdad, or
brigade headquarters. 162 For many families, their only avenue was as part of the
military's mass processing of claims, a process that requires extreme
perseverance.163 This process can be prohibitive for those who do not have safe
passage or the resources to travel.1 64
Once a claim is submitted, a judge advocate reviews the evidence,
including the claims card and the "significant activity reports" that are
completed after a field incident, to determine whether the party is eligible for a
FCA payment and, if not, "whether a condolence payment is appropriate."'
Because of the combat exclusion, FCA claims have been rare in Afghanistan
and Iraq,1 66 with most payments coming in the form of condolence or solatia.
The review process often takes approximately a month,167 though mass claim
processing or high profile claims can occasionally unfold substantially faster,
with some determinations even made on the spot.1 68
Once approved, payments can be made during personal visits or at Civil
Military Operation Centers.1 69 Soldiers tasked with disbursing solatia or
condolence payments receive guidance on the amount to be disbursed, the
process to be followed, and their roles and responsibilities. 17 0 In practice,
training is limited and has "focused almost solely on the procedural and
primarily relies on civilians to bring claims to the attention of military personnel by approaching
bases.").
162. See HEARTS AND MINDS: POST-WAR CIVILIAN DEATHS IN BAGHDAD CAUSED BY U.S.
FORCES, HUM. RTS. WATCH 48 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1003full.pdf
[hereinafter Hearts and Minds].
163. See Bryan Bender, Condolence Payments to Iraqis Soar, BOS. GLOBE (June 8, 2006),
http://archive.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/06/08/condolence-payments to iraqis soar/
(mentioning the distribution of more than $570,000 condolence payments in a single day in Iraq); Darrin
Mortensen, Persistence Pays - Mother, Brother Push for Payments for Woman's Death, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE (Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-persistence-pays-mother-
brother-push-for-payments-2005jan25-story.html (describing solatia process in Iraq).
164. See Cora Currier, Our Condolences: How the U.S. Paid for Death and Damage in
Afghanistan, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.theintercept.com/2015/02/27/payment-
civilians-afghanistan; Nick Turse, Blood Money: Afghanistan 's Reparations Files, THE NATION (Sept.
19, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/blood-money-afghanistans-reparations-files/ (discussing
conversation with Afghanistan's former ambassador to the United States).
165. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN 32 (May 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07699.pdf; CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY
OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ VOLUME I, MAJOR COMBAT
OPERATIONS (1I SEPTEMBER 2001 TO 1 MAY 2003) 185 (Aug. 1, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army
/clamo-vI.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL LESSONS].
166. Newly Released Documents Reveal Details of Civilian Casualty Claims in Afghanistan
and Iraq, ACLU (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/news/newly-released-documents-reveal-details-
civilian-casualty-claims-afghanistan-and-iraq (reporting that many of the 800 claims submitted for
compensation or condolence payments were denied based on the so-called "combat exemption" of the
FCA).
167. Hearts and Minds, supra note 162, at 48.
168. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 165, at 33.
169. Id.
170. LEGAL LESSONS, supra note 165, at 181-85.
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bureaucratic processes of paying compensation rather than any interpersonal or
cultural aspect" of the condolence interaction.'7 1
In sum, while the status quo demands reparations for illegal acts, when
international and domestic law permit the imposition of harm, states choose
whether to distribute monetary payments or otherwise respond to the harm at
their discretion. As we will see, however, existing solatia and condolence
practices are inadequate in serving either the needs of those harmed or of the
harm-doers.
II. ROLE OF AMENDS
Amends consist of the reparative measures undertaken by an individual or
group that has caused harm. It is tempting to focus narrowly on financial and
other material compensation as the key elements of amends.1 72 But while
monetary amends are surely important, other mechanisms for making amends
are also vital. These important reparative measures might consist of other
material assistance, service, expressions of remorse or sympathy, apologies,
accounts or other information about what happened, and promises of
forbearance. 73
Amends in some forms could be required as a consequence of a legal
proceeding when harm has been caused by unlawful conduct. But amends need
not be limited to those remedies ordered by a court or other tribunal or those
offered in the shadow of such legal liability. Indeed, in the context of the
military's lawful killing of civilians, neither the desire for, nor the offering of
amends, is necessarily grounded in any legal claim. Instead, amends are more
likely to flow from the needs of affected civilians and the needs of the military
and the soldiers involved in the relevant incidents.
Before approaching a possible redesign that incorporates a more robust
notion of amends into the military's existing responses to lawful killings, it is
essential to know what functions might be served by making amends in this
context. In furtherance of that end, we identify both demand-side and supply-
side justifications for the provision of amends via condolence and solatia
payments. Basic emotional and pragmatic considerations counsel for both
financial and emotional recognition of the harm done. Both directly affected
171. E-mail from Nick Dubaz, to Lesley M. Wexler (Sept. 12, 2015, 5:36 PM).
172. See generally Jeremy Joseph, Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using
Mediated Condolence Payments, 23 NEGOT. J. 219, 224-25 (2007) (noting that existing compensation
practices in Iraq contain "no systematic, policy-level attempt to engage the individual Iraqis in
meaningful dialogue or to express actual sympathy on a personal level").
173. LINDA RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS 5
(2009); MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS AFTER
wRONGDOING 191 (2006); Jerry Goodstein et al., Moral Repair in the Workplace: A Qualitative
Investigation and Inductive Model, 138 J. Bus. ETHICS 17 (2015); Holewinski, supra note 105, at 320.
Apologies, in particular, are central to the content and process of making amends. See, e.g., Goodstein et
al., supra note 173 (finding that apologies are frequently included in amends). At their simplest,
apologies are thought to include "acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the violated rule, admission of
fault and responsibility for its violation, and the expression of genuine regret and remorse for the harm
done." NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 3 (1991);
see also Craig W. Blatz et al., Government Apologies for Historical Injustices, 30 POL. PSYCHOL. 219
(2009) (articulating elements of government apologies for past injustices).
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individuals and their communities may benefit in a variety of ways from these
payments. In turn, such benefits may allow the armed forces to more
successfully win the hearts and minds of the relevant community, or to at least
avoid encouraging people to align with forces on the other side. 17 4 A carefully
developed process of making amends may also satisfy the emotional needs of
military personnel, addressing the moral injuries of troops who have inflicted
injuries on others and reinforcing the professional ethics of the armed forces.
A. Demand-Side
Desire for amends might come from affected individuals, their families,
and their communities. But given the impossibility of making people whole
after they have lost a family member to military action, what might victims
want? In the wake of a loss, family members might seek acknowledgement of
their injury as well as an indication that the injurer accepts responsibility for
that loss. These desires may be amplified in societies that have existing cultural
expectations about the acknowledgement of responsibility for having caused
harm. Families may wish to have an explanation of the events, actions, and
decisions leading to the loss. In addition, families may be forward-looking and
desire promises of forbearance that might prevent future casualties. And, of
course, families may seek financial payments to pay for short-term costs, to
help with other expenses, or as another mechanism for signaling recognition
and respect.
1. Acknowledgement
First, affected family members may want their losses acknowledged.1 75
Those grieving a family member often seek recognition that they are suffering a
terrible loss.1'7  Acknowledgment of that suffering and loss respects their
dignity.' 7 7 It treats the injured as humans deserving of having their emotions
known and responded to.' 7 8
174. Lyall et al., supra note 160.
175. See E.L. Gaston & Rebecca Wright, Losing the People: The Costs and Consequences of
Civilian Suffering in Afghanistan, CIVIC (2009); Christopher Rogers, Civilian Harm and Conflict in
Northwest Pakistan, CIVIC (2010). The U.S. military has internalized this knowledge in practices such
as in-person notification of death as well as condolence letters to the family of service members who die
during service. Paul T. Bartone & Morten G. Ender, Organizational Responses to Death in the Military,
18 DEATH STUDIES 25, 29 (1994); see also SUSAN F. HIRSCH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST
CALAMITY: TERRORISM, GRIEF, AND A VICTIM'S QUEST FOR JUSTICE 46 (2006) (noting that after the
embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, an affected family member
expressed that "receiving U.S. government assistance was important to me. My persistence in seeking it
emerged ... from a desire for the government to acknowledge my loss").
176. Empirical evidence suggests that those grieving losses incurred in war settings are
particularly prone to suffer from major depressive disorders and post-traumatic stress disorders. PAI
Kristensen et al., Bereavement and Mental Health after Sudden and Violent Losses: A Review, 75
PSYCHIATRY 76, 79-80 (2012).
177. Sahr Muhammedally, Making Amends, in ACKNOWLEDGE, AMEND, ASSIST: ADDRESSING
CIVILIAN HARM CAUSED BY ARMED CONFLICT AND ARMED VIOLENCE 11, 12 (Harv. L. Sch. Hum. Rts.
Program & Violence, eds., 2015).
178. One might draw a parallel to the condolence letters the United States provides to service
members' families. These letters acknowledge the soldier's humanity.
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As part of this acknowledgement, victims may desire those who played a
causal role in the deaths to accept responsibility for having caused harm.' 79 In
some instances, recognition of responsibility for having caused harm might
come in the form of punishment handed down following legal procedures.
Others have used litigation not to seek judicially ordered punishment or
compensation, but to obtain public acknowledgement and an apology for
mistaken drone strikes.'80 But in the case of lawfully caused harm,
acknowledgement of responsibility will likely need to come in a different form.
It might come in the form of an apology. Or it might simply consist of an
acknowledgment of the actor's role in causing the death.
Acceptance of responsibility for having caused harm is the central feature
of an apology-the element that distinguishes, for many, a true apology from
other forms of accounting for a transgression-such as denial, excuse, or
justification.' 8' Empirical research demonstrates that accepting responsibility
for having caused harm tends to contribute significantly to positive assessments
of and reactions to an apology and the transgression itself,1 82 though an
expression of sympathy without a concomitant taking of responsibility can also
have positive, though smaller, effects as well.I"
Much of the existing research on the effects of taking responsibility for
having caused harm has been done in the context of apologies offered
following negligent behavior. Acknowledgement in the case of lawful killing of
civilians in armed conflict differs somewhat from this paradigmatic case. Many
cases of harm lawfully caused by a state do not fit neatly into the negligence
model, as lawful killing of civilians can occur in the absence of negligence. In
some instances, the risk to civilians is known, but determined to be justified.
179. In the tort context, see for example Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted
Families To File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361
(1992); and Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives
Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994). Motives related to accountability were at play in
one family's decision not to accept settlement with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund set
up by the U.S. Congress. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & Soc'Y REV. 645, 661 (2008) (reporting
that the family wanted a trial so that the defendants could be held accountable for their decisions).
180. Shane, supra note 133.
181. See ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113
(1971); TAVUCHIS, supra note 173, at 3; Barry R. Schlenker & Michael F. Weigold, Interpersonal
Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 133, 162 (1992);
Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REv. 46, 59 (1968).
182. See, e.g., Kristin M. Pace et al., The Acceptance of Responsibility and Expressions of
Regret in Organizational Apologies After a Transgression, 15 CORP. COMM. 410, 420 (2010); Jennifer
K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460,
486-89, 495-97 (2003) [hereinafter, Robbenolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement]; Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 359-365 (2006)
[hereinafter Robbenolt, Settlement Levers]; Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the
Things People Say To Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127, 134-36 (1997); Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and Subjective
Account Components on Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465, 476 (2004).
183. Robbennolt, Settlement Levers, supra note 182; see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising
Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Arie Nadler & Ido Liviatan, Intergroup
Reconciliation: Effects ofAdversary's Expressions ofEmpathy, Responsibility, and Recipients' Trust, 32
PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459 (2006); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in
Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1997).
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This distinction is important because these decisions might strike victims as
more intentional than negligent and perceptions of intentionality are
particularly important to attributions of blame. 8 4 Victims tend to perceive the
harm as more severe, tend to be angrier, and tend to be less likely to forgive
when a transgression is perceived as being intentional.'18 At the same time,
victims are also more likely to desire an apology when the harm is viewed as
having been intentionally inflicted. 86
In addition, we might separately be concerned with a more general sense
of the ways in which the injurer acts to cause additional injury following the
infliction of the original harm. In particular, the notion of "reactive fault"
focuses on how the injurer responds to the injured party after the injury. 87
Consider our reactions to a "hit-and-run" driver: "The problem with 'hit-and-
run' driving is not just the colliding ... but with the fleeing." 88 As described
by one commentator,
While inadvertent harms, as noted, lack the feature of being objectively insulting in
themselves, that status begins to change once the injurer, aware now of what he's
done, ignores it, acting as though nothing untoward had happened. In particular, if
he inflicts the harm and makes no effort to redress or apologize for it, that behavior
or set of behaviors, unlike the mere harmful action alone, does arguably constitute
an objective form of insult or slight or disrespect. . . . Harming someone and then
not attempting to redress it treats the victim as though one is free to harm her in that
way. And this treatment, or mistreatment, is objectively insulting and disrespectful,
even if the initial harmful behavior was not. 18 9
Taking responsibility for having caused harm can help to mitigate this
secondary, after-the-fact, injury.
2. Respect, Culture, and Ritual
As the literature on reactive fault suggests, the way in which injured
parties are treated in the aftermath of an injury communicates something about
184. See John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and
Retributive Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 324 (2003); ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra
note 91.
185. See, e.g., Daniel L. Ames & Susan T. Fiske, Intentional Harms Are Worse, Even When
They're Not, 24 PSYCHOL. SC. 1755 (2013); John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage
Assessment as a Result of the Intentionality of the Damage-Causing Act, 29 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 181
(1990); Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1260 n.12
(2008); Joost M. Leunissen et al., The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim 's Need for
Apologies and Perpetrator's Willingness To Apologize, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 315
(2013).
186. Leunissen et al., supra note 185, at 319.
187. See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REv. 903, 931 (2005)
[hereinafter Cohen, The Immorality of Denial]; Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law:
Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1141, 1195-1200 (1983); Jeffrey S.
Heimreich, Does "Sorry" Incriminate? Evidence, Harm, and the Protection ofApology, 21 CORNELL J.
L. PUB. POL'Y 567, 583-84 (2012).
188. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, supra note 187, at 931; see also John Braithwaite &
Declan Roche, Responsibility and Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE:
REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 63, 72 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds.,
2001) (noting the "intuition that with hit-and-run driving, the running is the greater evil than the
hitting").
189. Heimreich, supra note 187, at 600.
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their social identity-that is, it communicates something about the way that
they are valued by others. "[T]reatment with dignity and respect are important
because they tell people that they have status within the group." 90 Not
surprisingly, then, research on procedural justice has found that people care
about being treated with respect-by institutions, in legal proceedings, by those
with whom they negotiate, and by those who have harmed them.i9 i Appropriate
amends making can demonstrate to individual victims and their communities a
respect for their humanity.1 92
The observation of ritual can be significant in this regard. Consider, for
example, the response of Jordan's King Hussein after a Jordanian soldier
opened fire on a group of Israeli schoolgirls, killing seven of them. Importantly,
the King met with mourning parents in a way that respected their rituals:
"Wearing a red-checkered kaffiyeh with his dark suit and accompanied by two
of his children. . . the King knelt before each of the families in their separate
homes as they sat on the floor in the Jewish custom for the seven-day mourning
period."'19 This response, including its recognition of ritual, went a long way
toward easing tensions between the two countries: "[c]ries for revenge simply
vanished."' 94
Or consider the aftermath of the collision between a U.S. submarine and
the Japanese fishing boat Ehime Maru, a collision that resulted in the sinking of
the Ehime Maru and a number of deaths:
The Japanese were unmoved by a presidential letter, official visits from the U.S.
Ambassador and the Admiral of the Fleet, and an anguished editorial in Time by the
submarine's commander, Scott Waddle. Waddle "should et on his knees and bow
his head to the floor," insisted one of the victims' fathers.' 5
It was not until the appropriate rituals were respected that Waddle's
apologies began to have any meaning for the affected families. 96 While the
190. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Strategies for Gaining Deference: Increasing Social Harmony
or Creating False Consciousness?, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS
69, 80 (John M. Darley et al. eds., 2001).
191. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (describing procedural justice); Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A
Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a "Fair" Process, 29
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 749 (2003) (exploring aspects of authorities that influence
perceptions of procedural justice); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 473 (2008) (exploring the role of procedural justice in negotiation); Dale T. Miller, Disrespect
and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 538 (2001) (reviewing research on
people's reactions to injustice).
192. See generally Miller, supra note 191.
193. Roger Conner & Patricia Jordan, Never Being Able To Say You're Sorry: Barriers to
Apology by Leaders in Group Conflicts, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 233-34 (2009) (quoting Serge
Schmemann, A Time To Mourn: King Hussein Comforts Israelis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/17/world/a-time-to-moum-king-hussein-comforts-israelis.htm).
194. Conner & Jordan, supra note 193, at 234.
195. Id. at 258 (quoting David J. Jefferson, Searching the Depths, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.newsweek.com/searching-depths-155665).
196. Conner & Jordan, supra note 193, at 258; see also RADZIK, supra note 173, at 103-05
(describing atonement rituals).
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harm in both of these instances was caused unlawfully,197 consideration for
expectations and ritual are no less important when the harm is brought about
lawfully.
Relatedly, victims may wish to be treated in ways that are consistent with
and respectful of the cultural practices of their society. Failure to treat them in
this way may be felt as an additional harm. 198 Respect for cultural practice can
be reflected in the rituals that are observed: "Different rituals signal that an
apology is being delivered for different cultural groups." 99 In addition, for
some societies, making amends for accidental deaths and injuries is deeply
rooted in cultural traditions.20 The nature of the amends varies, but often
includes compensation as one of many components. For instance, the Islamic
doctrine of fiqh has an "underlying and fundamental concept of compensation
for life, limb, and property."20 ' Under the Pashtunwali legal code, 202 Pashtuns
often provide compensation for someone accidentally killed to ensure the honor
of the victim.203 Under traditional Somali law, clans will offer so-called "blood
money" to address the loss of a loved one.20 These varied practices share the
absence of a state-based legal requirement to pay and generally do not
specifically assign fault, though they often establish the facts of the injury.
These practices often also include rituals to emphasize reconciliation.2 05
197. After a Pentagon inquiry and non-judicial punishment, the U.S. military decided not to
court-martial Commander Waddle on negligent homicide charges. He did commit lesser violations of
the UCMJ: dereliction of duty and subjecting a vessel to hazard. John Kifner, Captain of Sub is
Reprimanded and Will Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/24/us
/captain-of-sub-is-reprimanded-and-will-quit.html. The Jordanian soldier who shot the school girls is
currently serving a life sentence. Associated Foreign Press, Jordanian Who Killed Israeli Schoolgirls
Goes on Hunger Strike, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/jordanian-
who-murdered-israeli-schoolgirls-on-hunger-strike.
198. See generally Erica Gaston, Kabul Notebook: Searching for More than Just Talk on
Civilian Casualties, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erica-
gaston/kabul-notebook-searching-b_170966.htm. For instance, an Afghani who lost 47 community
members to an airstrike in July 2008 described the failure to acknowledge or apologize for loss as
"pour[ing] salt in the wound." Erica Gaston, Salt in the Wound: The Case for Compensation,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erica-gaston/salt-in-the-wound-the-
cas b 72312.html.
199. Conner & Jordan, supra note 193, at 257.
200. The United States has long recognized Japan, Korea, and Thailand as countries with such
a local custom. Air Force Instruction 51-501, Tort Claims, ¶ 5.27 (Sept. 13, 2016); see also George E.
Irani & Nathan C. Funk, Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives, 20 ARAB STUD. Q. 53
(1998).
201. WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARIA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 309 (2009).
202. See generally Lesley Wexler, Beyond Literacy: A Response to Tom Ginsburg's An
Economic Interpretation of the Pashtunwali, 2011 U. CH. LEGAL F. 115 (2011).
203. Holewinski, supra note 105, at 318.
204. NIKOLAUS GRUBECK, CAMPAIGN FOR INNOCENT VICTIMS IN CONFLICT, CIVILIAN HARM
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3. Explanation
Victims may also desire information.20 6 Sudden unexpected and violent
deaths can be particularly traumatiC 207 with family members often having
questions about the circumstances of their loved one's death.208 Relatives may
want to know details surrounding the cause and nature of such deaths, 209
including why the military chose a particular target, what precautions it took,
and how, if at all, the military plans to change its behavior going forward.
Victims often believe that knowing such information can Help make sense of
the death. As Susan Hirsch explains in her account of the effects of the terrorist
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania,
As the acute trauma abated, the urgency of questions grew about who had carried
out these horrific acts and how. I found myself increasingly preoccupied by another
question: Why? Why had the embassies been attacked? I began a quest to answer
this and other related "why" questions, for myself, my husband, our families, and
everyone else affected. 2 10
Apologies and other avenues for providing amends are valued to the
extent that they provide an explanation to a victim or a victim's family about
what has happened. For instance, in some types of tort cases, one reason why
claimants bring lawsuits is to obtain an explanation for how their injuries
occurred.211 Claimants in medical malpractice lawsuits, for example, often
assert that they filed suit to get information about what happened to them. Once
they obtain that information, many claimants drop their claims. 212 In addition,
medical malpractice claimants who are promptly provided with information
about their medical care, any problems, and their condition, are less likely to
file lawsuits. 213 Similarly, employees who receive explanations for adverse
206. See HIRSCH, supra note 175 (describing desire for information in the aftermath of the
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania); Hadfield, supra note
179 (describing 9/11 victims' desire for information); Hickson et al., supra note 179 (describing a desire
for information in the tort context); Vincent et al., supra note 179 (describing a desire for information in
the tort context); see also Rachel Abrams & Danielle Ivory, G.M. Secrecy on Crashes Adds to Families'
Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/business/barriers-wall-off-the-
facts-of-gm-car-crashes.html.
207. Stacey Kaltman & George A. Bonanno, Trauma and Bereavement: Expanding the Impact
ofSudden and Violent Deaths, 17 J. ANxIETY DISORDERS 131, 132 (2003).
208. William Dubin & Jeffrey Samoff, Sudden Unexpected Death: Intervention with the
Survivors, 15 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 54, 55 (1985).
209. Els Merleverde, Perceptions, Needs and Mourning Reactions of Bereaved Relatives
Confronted with a Sudden Unexpected Death, 61 RESUSCITATION 341, 346 (2004).
210. HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 2.
211. See, e.g., Hickson et al., supra note 179; Vincent et al., supra note 179; see also Thomas
H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure ofMedical Errors, 289
JAMA 1001, 1004-05 (2003) (finding that injured patients want and expect to receive information about
what happened, what will be done, and their medical condition; and that "explanations of the error that
were incomplete or evasive would increase their distress" and that they wanted such information to be
provided without having to ask for it).
212. See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Dropped Medical Malpractice Claims: Their Surprising
Frequency, Apparent Causes, and Potential Remedies, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1343, 1345-46 (2011).
213. See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision To File a
Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 L. & SOC'Y REv. 413, 427 (1995).
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employment decisions (for example, firings or layoffs) are less likely to file
claims against their employers. 214
Information or explanations may be beneficial in and of themselves as
people independently value understanding what happened to them. For
instance, when Yemeni Faisal al Jaber received $100,000 in cash after a drone
strike killed two relatives, he lamented: "How can it be that money is given in
this way without any paperwork and in this secretive manner. One thinks the
U.S. believes it can silence the families of the victims with money" rather than
giving "an apology [for the drone strike] and an explanation." 215 He has since
filed suit in the United States, seeking a declaration from the U.S. courts that
the strike was unlawful, noting that "[t]he president has now admitted to killing
innocent Americans and Italians with drones" and asking "why are the
bereaved families of innocent Yemenis less entitled to the truth?" 216 Similarly,
in response to the U.S. strike on the Kunduz hospital in 2015, the president of
Doctors Without Borders sought information. She demanded an independent
investigation, noting that "[w]e have received apologies and condolences, but
this is not enough. We are still in the dark about why a well-known hospital full
of patients and medical staff was repeatedly bombarded for more than an hour.
We need to understand what happened and why." 2 17
In addition, provision of information to a victim can "convey respect for
the victim and affirm his or her status. The very fact that the perpetrator thinks
that the victim is due an explanation signals respect for the victim and tends to
diminish the victim's anger." 218 Providing an explanation about what happened
can be valuable, therefore, whether or not it is coupled with the taking of
responsibility.
4. Non-Repetition
Information is often sought so that sense can be -made of what has
happened. But information is also often sought in service of the hope that
things will be different going forward. Thus, another component identified by
many as a key element of amends is a promise by or commitment from the
214. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road From Employee to Complainant:
Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful-Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SC. Q. 557,
576 (2000) (finding that "whereas claims were filed by less than one fiftieth (1.8 percent) of those who
felt they were given a very complete explanation of the reason they were losing their jobs, claims were
filed by nearly one-fifth (19.5 percent) of those who reported being given no explanation at all"). See
generally John C. Shaw et al., To Justify or Excuse? A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of
Explanations, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 444 (2003) (reporting a meta-analysis finding that explanations
influence justice perceptions).
215. Michael Isikoff, After an Errant Drone Strike in Yemen, A Trail of Secret Meetings and
U.S. Cash, YAHoo NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/news/an-errant-drone-strike-in-
yemen-a-secret-white-house-meeting-and-a-bag-of-cash-213034643.html (quoting Faisal bin Ali
Jaber, whose nephew and brother in law were killed by a U.S. strike in Yemen).
216. Shane, supra note 133.
217. MSF: Global Body Asked To Probe US. Bombing of Afghan Hospital, AL JAZEERA
AMERICA (Oct. 14, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/14/msf-ihffc-asked-to-probe-
kunduz-hospital-bombing.html; see also Shear & Sengupta, supra note 6.
218. Miller, supra note 191.
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injurer not to cause similar harm in the future. 219 Indeed, reform or behavioral
change is often one of the goals of injured parties in dispute resolution. 220
People want to be assured that the person or institution that caused their harm
has learned from the experience and want steps to be taken so that the same
thing does not happen to them or to others in the future.221 Accomplishing such
change may be a way for people to begin to regain a sense of safety,22 2 to make
sense of or give meaning to the loss that they have experienced, or to ensure
that their family member did not die in vain.223
One reason why apologies, in particular, may be effective at resolving
disputes and repairing relationships is that they tend to convey that the
complained of behavior will not be repeated. This is so, even when such a
promise is not explicitly included in the words of the apology. 224 This desire for
a change of behavior in the future may also be one reason why the acceptance
of responsibility is central to apologies-such responsibility-taking tends to
convey that the transgressor understands and will not repeat the complained-of
behavior.225
5. Repair and Compensation
As with promises of forbearance, offers of repair or compensation are
also thought to be important components of amends. 226 Both the immediate
victims and victimized communities may seek financial assistance to cope with
219. See, e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 181, at 113; Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The
Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L. & SOC'Y REv. 461,
469-70 (1986).
220. In the tort context see Gallagher et al., supra note 211, at 1004; Hickson et al., supra note
179, at 1361; Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical
Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 415 (2004); Kathleen M. Mazor et al., More Than Words:
Patients' Views on Apology and Disclosure When Things Go Wrong in Cancer Care, 90 PATIENT EDUC.
& CouNs. 341, 345 (2013); and Vincent et al., supra note 179, at 1611.
221. Gallagher et al., supra note 211, at 1004; Mazor et al., Health Plan Members, supra note
220, at 415; Mazor et al., More. Than Words, supra note 220, at 345; Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the
Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litigation Aims, 68 U. PiTT. L. REv. 701, 723
(2007); Vincent et al., supra note 179, at 1611.
222. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 59-60 (2004).
223. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Path Between Sebastian s Hospitals: Fostering
Reconciliation After a Tragedy, 17 BARRY L. REv. 89, 117-23 (2011) (describing how one family found
meaning in the wake of their son's death).
224. See James R. Davis & Gregg J. Gold, An Examination of Emotional Empathy, Attributions
ofStability, and the Link Between Perceived Remorse and Forgiveness, 50 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 392, 394 (2011); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity,
and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 294, 296
(2000); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and
Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 219, 221 (1989); Jennifer F. Orleans &
Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressions,
6 ACAD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 49 (1984); Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, Remorse and a Previously
Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85
PSYCHOL. REP. 246, 248 (1999); Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 182, at 487,
495; Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 293 (1991).
225. Scher & Darley, supra note 182.
226. See, e.g., NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES 80-91 (2008)
(detailing the components of apologies); Goffman, supra note 181, at 113 (same).
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the economic consequences of an injury. 227 They may need short-term relief to
provide for burial and other immediate costs associated with death. They may
seek to be made whole: to receive money that would replace the financial
contributions of the deceased or injured person. Alternatively, in light of
collective suffering and hardship, they might want resources to facilitate
rebuilding and promote economic opportunity in their community.
The idea that harm repair is fundamental to amends was usefully
articulated by Bishop Desmond Tutu as follows: "If you take my pen and say
you are sorry, but don't give me the pen back, nothing has happened." 2 8
Consistent with this intuition, research has found that offers of repair contribute
to the effectiveness of amends.229 And offers of repair or compensation can
imply other components of amends, such as expressing remorse or taking
responsibility,230 though it is unclear how well this finding generalizes to the
sorts of relatively modest payments that are offered for purposes of condolence
(rather than compensation) with which we are concerned here.
But research does offer some evidence that symbolic monetary awards for
emotional harm can have positive effects. An example comes from an
exploration of symbolic payments for emotional harm in the Netherlands and
Belgium. 231' Researchers assessed reactions to a legislative proposal in the
Netherlands and a law in Belgium that provided for a financial award to be paid
by the wrongdoer to the family members of those who are killed or severely
injured as a result of a criminal act or accident.23 2 These payments are
specifically described as not offering "real compensation" and are not
accompanied by apologies or expressions of sympathy, but are modest
monetary payments intended to have symbolic value in recognizing emotional
harm. 233 Despite these limits, potential recipients of such payments in the
Netherlands reacted positively to the possibility of such awards, and saw the
payments as acknowledging responsibility for the harm-causing incident and as
signaling fair treatment of victims. 234 Interestingly, the more blame respondents
attributed to the offender, the more they recognized a need for and anticipated a
greater appreciation for such a symbolic award. 235
227. Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, AMNESTY INT'L 39-40 (2013),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/asa330132013en.pdf.
228. NANCY BERLINGER, AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF FORGIVENESS
61-62 (2005).
229. See e.g., William P. Bottom et al., When Talk Is Not Cheap: Substantive Penance and
Expressions of Intent in Rebuilding Cooperation, 13 ORG. SC. 497 (2002); Scher & Darley, supra note
182; Schmitt et al., supra note 182; Jeanne S. Zechmeister, Don't Apologize Unless You Mean It: A
Laboratory Investigation ofForgiveness and Retaliation, 23 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 532 (2004).
230. Schmitt et al., supra note 182.
231. Liesbeth Hulst & Amo J. Akkermans, Can Money Symbolize Acknowledgment? How
Victims' Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their Emotional Harm, 4 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 245
(2011).
232. Per the legislation, a fixed amount would be paid to the family member(s) by the offender,
but "[i]n practice, these costs would almost always be bome by the harm-doer's insurer, or by a violent
crime victim compensation fund." Id. at 247.
233. Id. at 246.
234. Id.at251.
235. Id. at 254.
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Actual recipients of such payments in Belgium also reacted positively,
but criticized the impersonal way in which the financial offers had been made
in practice.2 36 They noted, for example,
(1) The letter was "written in cold rationalistic terms. . . . The letter was the same
as the letter for the damage to the car."
(2) "The letter referred to a file number, just a file number. Not a person. And
nothing emotional. A 'cold fish' letter."
(3) "The letter included wording such as 'with reference to' rather than something
like 'in view of the murder of your daughter on that date, we have decided to
issue a payment in satisfaction, of this and that amount.' It could also be done
in more humane, warm wording. They ought to mention the name of the child
rather than 'Re: file number."'
2 37
Similar complaints have been heard from the families of civilians killed
in armed conflict settings. 238 Thus, symbolic monetary payments can be
welcome and effective, but the way in which they are distributed matters to
victims.
B. Supply-Side
Amends serve a variety of purposes for injured persons, but injurers may
find it very difficult to offer amends. Consider apologies. Apologizing is
uncomfortable, creates vulnerability, and is hard to do effectively. 239 In the
context of armed conflict, security concerns may also inhibit comfort with
making amends. But even though there are barriers, there are also a variety of
countervailing considerations that justify the offering of amends from the
perspective of the offeror. In particular, offering amends has the potential to
further important military objectives, address soldiers' moral injuries, and
contribute to the professionalization of the military.
1. Hearts and Minds
From the perspective of the supplying state, making amends can assist
with the state's ultimate military objectives by helping to win the hearts and
minds of the local population. In counterinsurgencies, gaining and maintaining
236. Id. at 255.
237. Id.
238. Spencer Ackerman, After Drones: The Indelible Mark of America's Remote Control
Warfare, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/21/drone-war-
obama-pakistan-cia (reporting that for one family member, "[a]n official letter came, acknowledging the
tragedy, but "the names of [his] family were not fully right").
239. See, e.g., CAROL TAVRIS & ELIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME):
WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2007). On the other hand,
not apologizing can allow the individual to preserve feelings of greater control, a greater sense of value
integrity, and more positive self-esteem. Tyler G. Okimoto et al., Refusing To Apologize Can Have
Psychological Benefits (and We Issue No Mea Culpa for this Research Finding), 43 EUR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 22 (2013); Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I'm Sorry, 72 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (2009); see also Andrew Molinsky & Joshua Margolis, Necessary Evils and
Interpersonal Sensitivity in Organizations, 30 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 245, 247 (2005) (noting that the mix
of roles necessary evils entail-"catalyst of good, source of harm, witness, and potential source of aid-
create psychological ambivalence"). Individuals vary in their proclivity to offer apologies. Andrew J.
Howell et al., The Disposition To Apologize, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 509 (2011).
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the support of the local population is essential to the overall mission; such
support increases information flow about the behavior and membership of the
insurgency, while simultaneously slowing information flow to and recruitment
by the insurgency.240 To prevail under such an approach, the local population
must believe that the military serves their interests better than the insurgents
do.24' Enhancing security is important, but often not enough to achieve
counterinsurgency goals.24 2 Similarly, mere compliance with the laws of war
may be a necessary but not sufficient effort.24 3 Even lawful collateral damage
can increase support for insurgencies and result in higher levels of insurgent
attacks.244 Because foreign militaries are, by definition, outsiders, locals will
respond to their bad behavior much more harshly than to similar acts
committed by local insurgencies.245 But the legitimacy of an authority is
judged, in part, by the ways in which the authority treats those whom it affects,
both during and after the encounter.246 Thus, adherence to both law and the
principle of humanity, as well as basic morals and ethics, 247 can help create
legitimacy and may provide a valuable contrast to insurgent behavior.2.4
240. See STATHIS KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 128 (2006); Luke Condra
& Jacob Shapiro, Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage, 56 AM. J. POL.
SC. 167, 169 (2012).
241. Toward that end, U.S. counterinsurgency manuals direct troops to minimize civilian
casualties, demonstrate restraint, satisfy community needs, mobilize support, as well as show "genuine
compassion" and act with "kindness" and empathy towards the locals. U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS,
COUNTERINSURGENCY §§ 1-138, 3-2, 3-8, 3-19, 5-2, 7-10, 7-11, 7-21, 7-23, 7-30, 7-32, 7-33, 7-48, A-7
(2006); U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS, INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES § 1-38
(2014); JOHN A. NAGL, THE U.S. ARMY/ MARINE CORtPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 294-95
(2007).
242. See Nicholas Sambanis, Parochialism as a Central Challenge in Counterinsurgency, 336
SCIENCE 805, 807 (2012) (discussing the mechanism by which violence can harden group identities).
243. Gregory McNeal, New Approaches To Reducing and Mitigating Harm to Civilians, in
SHAPING A GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 127, 128 (2012).
244. Condra & Shapiro, supra note 240, at 168, 177; Andrew Shaver & Jacob Shapiro, The
Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War (Households Conflict
Network, Working Paper No. 210, 2016), http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jns/files/shaver
.shapiro -2016 tips.pdf (finding that "information flow goes down after government forces
inadvertently kill civilians and it goes up when insurgents do so"). Assessments of ISAF data have
revealed that in Afghanistan there is a relationship between civilian casualties and an increase in future
violent incidents-consistent with the revenge hypothesis. Luke Condra et al., The Effect of Civilian
Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq 22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16152,
2010). But see Alexander Downes, Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the
Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy, 9 CRy. WARS 420, 427, 438,
440 (2007) (discussing historical examples in which indiscriminate civilian violence have helped states
defeat insurgencies); Jason Lyall, Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from
Chechnya, 53 J. CONFLICT RES. 331, 338 (2009) (concluding that indiscriminate government violence
did not cause an increase in insurgent violence).
245. Lyall et al., supra note 160, at 679.
246. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375
(2006). For an example, see Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople View
Good Policing (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 255, 2014),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2116645 (describing the dynamics of this interplay
in the context of domestic policing).
247. Sam Sarkesian & Thomas Gannon, Professionalism: Problems and Challenges, in WAR,
MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 127, 131 (Malham Wakin ed., 1979).
248. GANESH SITARAMAN, THE COUNTERINSURGENT'S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE AGE OF
SMALL WARS (2013); see also Goodstein, Butterfield & Neale, supra note 173, at 31-32 (finding that
amends can result in increased "goodwill" from the target).
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Recent empirical research on the effects of U.S. attempts to win hearts
and minds has been mixed and strongly suggests that implementation matters a
great deal. For instance, aid, one of the components of a counterinsurgency
strategy, often fails to improve attitudes toward foreign military actors.249 in
fact, poorly designed aid programs can increase, rather than ameliorate,
grievances and reduce, rather than enhance, support for the state.250 Context
may matter as well. One study concluded that while development aid may not
generally reduce violence, small, well-tailored projects did do so in Iraq but not
Afghanistan. 25 1 While the evidence on existing condolence and solatia
payments is scant, a recent study found that while such efforts did not increase
support for the combatants offering the aid, they were associated with a
decrease in support for rival combatants.252
2. Soldiers'Moral Injuries
Amends might also address the moral injury of individual soldiers
responsible for civilian deaths. A "moral injury" is a violation of an
individual's belief and expectation that he and others will behave "in a just and
ethical manner." 253 Killing civilians, even if done lawfully or accidentally, may
create a significant moral injury25 4 by transgressing fundamental personal
beliefs such as: "the world is just";2 55 "people get what they deserve"; 256
military service "creates a better world"; 257 and killing innocents is wrong. 258
249. Jan Rasmus Bohnke & Christoph Zurcher, Aid, Minds and Hearts: The Impact ofAid in
Conflict Zones, 30 CONFICT MGMT. & PEACE SC. 411, 427 (2013).
250. Steven A. Zyck, How To Lose Allies and Finance Your Enemies: The Economisation of
Conflict Termination in Afghanistan, 12 CONFLICT, SECURITY, & DEV. 249, 249 (2012).
251. Tiffany Chou, Does Development Assistance Reduce Violence? Evidence from
Afghanistan, 7 ECON. PEACE & SECURITY J. 5, 5 (2012).
252. Lyall et al., supra note 160, at 693.
253. Kent D. Drescher et al., An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the Construct of
Moral Injury in War Veterans, 17 TRAUMATOLOGY 8, 9 (2011). Moral injury can be more fully defined
as "disruption in an individual's confidence and expectations about one's own or others' motivation or
capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner." Id. This sort of injury should not be unexpected as
moral traits and morality are considered to be central to personal identity. Nina Strohminger & Shaun
Nichols, The Essential Moral Self 131 COGNITION 159, 168 (2014); see also Karl Aquino & Americus
Reed II, The Self-Importance of Moral Identity, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1423, 1436
(2002) (discussing "the relevance of moral identity as a predictor of moral cognition and behavior").
254. Shira Maguen & Brett Litz, Moral Injury in Veterans of War, 23 PTSD RES. Q. 1, 1
(2012); Jonathan Shay, Moral Injury, 16 INTERTEXTS 57, 59 (2012); Maria M. Steenkamp et al., How
Best To Treat Deployment-Related Guilt and Shame: Commentary on Smith, Dauz, and Rauch (2013),
20 COGNITtVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 471, 471 (2013); Alison Flipse Vargas et al., Moral Injury Themes in
Combat Veterans' Narrative Responses from the National Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Study, 19
TRAUMATOLOGY 243, 248 (2013).
255. Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process:
Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1030 (1978).
256. Brett T. Litz et al., Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model
and Intervention Strategy, 29 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 695, 699 (2009).
257. A. Nazarov et al., Role of Morality in the Experience of Guilt and Shame Within the
Armed Forces, 132 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 4, 13 (2015).
258. Flipse Vargas et al., supra note 254, at 248. This is consistent with psychological
evidence suggesting that individual battle failure is most commonly attributed to "fear of killing rather
than fear of being killed." Captain Gordon B. Baldwin, A New Look at the Law of War: Limited War and
Field Manual 27-10, 4 MIL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959).
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Soldiers are particularly at risk for moral injuries in non-traditional conflicts
where distinguishing combatants and civilians is difficult.259 Empirical research
on the war on terror suggests both that a significant percentage of American
soldiers have killed civilians 260 and that many soldiers seem to be suffering
from moral injuries. 261
Moral injuries can have a devastating impact on individuals. While not
every soldier who kills a civilian will experience a moral injury, those who do
may believe their behavior is "immoral, irredeemable, and unrepairable" 262 or
more generally that the world itself is immoral.2 63 These soldiers may
experience extreme shame and guilt, 264 with consequences including alcohol
and drug abuse,265 domestic violence, 266 as well as suicide. 267 As more soldiers'
lives are lost each year to suicide than to combat, 268 this problem of moral
injury merits sustained attention and resources.
Feelings of guilt are not limited to unlawful killing or injuries-instances
in which one would be held legally responsible for a particular harm. Simply
having caused harm to another can result in feelings of guilt,269 even if it is
clear that one would not be held legally liable. The notion of "agent regret"
259. Litz et al., supra note 256, at 696; Flipse Vargas et al., supra note 254, at 248.
260. Twenty percent as of 2004 for Iraq and Afghanistan. Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat
Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 N. ENG. J. MED. 13,
18(2004).
261. Jacob K. Farnsworth et al., The Role for Moral Emotions in Military Trauma:
Implications for the Study and Treatment of Moral Injury, 18 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 249, 250 (2014)
(noting that the percentage is about 20%). For an individual example, see Dexter Filkins, Atonement: A
Troubled Iraq Veteran Seeks Out the Family He Harmed, NEW YORKER (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/29/atonement.
262. Litz et. al., supra note 256, at 698.
263. See Filkins, supra note 261 (quoting a psychiatrist as saying that soldiers "hate it when
they have killed somebody they didn't need to kill.... It's a scar on their soul").
264. Erin R. Smith et al., Perceived Perpetration During Traumatic Events: Clinical
Suggestions From Experts in Prolonged Exposure Therapy, 20 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 461, 461-
62 (2013); see also Molinsky & Margolis, supra note 239, at 251 (2005) (discussing how the need to
perform "necessary evils" can result in feelings of guilt).
265. Shira Maguen et al., The Impact ofReported Direct and Indirect Killing on Mental Health
Symptoms in Iraq War Veterans, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 86, 89 (2010); Shira Maguen & Brett Litz,
Moral Injury in the Context of War, U.S. DEP'T VETS. AFFS. (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/co-occurring/moral-injury-at-war.asp.
266. Shay, supra note 254, at 184.
267. Kent D. Drescher et al., Morality and Moral Injury: Insights from Theology and Health
Science, REFLECTIVE PRAC.: FORMATION & SUPERVISION MINISTRY 50, 58 (2013); Shira Maguen,
Killing in Combat May Be Independently Associated with Suicidal Ideation, 29 DEPRESSION & ANXtETY
918, 921 (2012); Nakashima Brock & Herman Keizer, Moral Injury: The Crucial Missing Piece in
Understanding Soldier Suicides, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/rita-nakashima-brock-ph-d/moral-injury-the-crucial-missing-piece-in-understanding-soldier-
suicides b_1686674.html.
268. William P. Corr, Suicides and Suicide Attempts Among Active Component Members of the
U.S. Armed Forces, 2010-2012: Methods of Self-Harm Vary by Major Geographic Region of
Assignment, 21 MED. SURVEILLANCE MONTHLY REP. 2, 2 (2014).
269. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 243,
245 (1994) (defining guilt as "an individual's unpleasant emotional state associated with possible
objections to his or her actions, inaction, circumstances, or intentions" and that is "based on the
possibility that one may be in the wrong or that others may have such a perception"). Feelings of guilt
can motivate the offering of an apology, a change in behavior, or the making of amends in other ways.
Id. at 257. Alternately, feelings of guilt can lead to the derogation (and avoidance) of victims. Id. at 251,
258.
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recognizes that an individual can experience a "special sort of negative reaction
on account of being the one who inflicted the damage, even if he did so
blamelessly." 270 Similarly, research on "necessary evils" in business suggests
that causing harm-even justified harm-can "elicit intense and potentially
disruptive thoughts and emotions in the doer."2 71
Moral injury relating to civilian deaths might result from a variety of
situations. For instance, face-to-face contact is not necessary to experience a
moral injury. Drone operators who never enter the physical space of a combat
zone still suffer from post-traumatic stress and moral injury.272 Even those with
no causal role may suffer as a result of witnessing or learning of a violation of
their belief system.273
The nascent research on both moral injury treatment and self-forgiveness
more broadly provides some important preliminary insights. First, self-
forgiveness is important to overcoming shame and guilt. The kind of self-
forgiveness that can alleviate symptoms includes "acknowledging the event,
[and] accepting responsibility for it," along with devoting energy to heal and
committing to living differently. 274 Second, helpful early interventions for those
with moral injuries include therapy275 and making amends.2 76 Examples of
activities that have been used in the therapeutic context include imagined
conversations with and letter writing to victims. 277 Moral repair is easier to
achieve for those individuals who can come to expect that "justice is balanced
270. Helmreich, supra note 187, at 583. "Survivor's guilt" offers another example in which
guilty feelings can exist simultaneously with recognition that the survivor is not to blame. See
Baumeister et al., supra note 269, at 251-52.
271. Joshua Margolis & Andrew Molinsky, Navigating the Bind of Necessary Evils:
Psychological Engagement and the Production of Interpersonally Sensitive Behavior, 51 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 847, 847 (2008) (reviewing studies); see also Molinsky & Margolis, supra note 239, at 247
("Necessary evils have three distinguishing characteristics: (1) a valued objective requires that they be
done, hence making them necessary; (2) they inflict ineradicable harm, and they therefore entail evil;
and (3) they are integral to the role the performer occupies, thus making them mandatory.").
272. While the empirical data on such injuries in this setting is new, military psychologists
endorse the application of this concept. Herman Keizer Jr., Stop Drone Strikes and the Moral Injury of
Their Pilots, STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:36 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/opn-
columns-blogs/other-voices/article9702050.html (describing the work of the "Soul Repair Center" in
leading research and public education on war-related trauma as moral injury).
273. Take, for example, the experience of Ron Ridenhour who was not present at the My Lai
massacre, but exposed the event after learning of it. He "remained bitter and disillusioned," about what
he considered to be a whitewash of the event. John H. Cushman Jr., Ronald Ridenhour, 52, Veteran Who
Reported My Lai Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/11l/us/ronald
-ridenhour-52-veteran-who-reported-my-lai-massacre.html.
274. Litz et al., supra note 256, at 700; see also Michael Wenzel et al., No Genuine Self-
Forgiveness Without Accepting Responsibility: Value Reaffirmation as a Key to Maintaining Positive
Self-Regard, 42 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 617, 624 (2012). See generally Julie H. Hall & Frank D.
Fincham, Self-Forgiveness: The Stepchild of Forgiveness Research, 24 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
621 (2005) (reviewing research on self-forgiveness). Believing that others forgive their transgression
can also aid self-forgiveness, though it is not a necessary condition. Nazarov, supra note 257, at 14; see
also Filkins, supra note 261 (describing a soldier who "wanted to know that the survivors understood
why he had done what he had, even if it was not entirely defensible. And he wanted them to know that
he felt their suffering in his own").
275. Litz et al., supra note 256, at 701.
276. Steenkamp et al., supra note 254, at 474; Everett L. Worthington, Jr. & Diana Langberg,
Religious Considerations and Self-Forgiveness in Treating Complex Trauma and Moral Injury in
Present and Former Soldiers, 40 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 274, 282-83 (2012).
277. Smith et al., supra note 264, at 468.
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(i.e., that transgressions have consequences and redress and repair are
possible)."27 8 Thus, in the wake of a moral injury, an "equally intense real-time
encounter with a countervailing experience" can be helpful. 27 9 Finally, making
amends in a way that reaffirms values that the individual holds dear-values
related to respect for humanity, honorable military service, or the protection of
innocent civilians-can enable individuals to reconcile their role in having
caused harm with their own sense of positive self-regard.280
Amends, therefore, including apologies and victim compensation, could
be justified as part of a self-forgiveness process for soldiers with moral injuries.
Well-designed amends processes could allow soldiers to know that their
victims' injuries have been acknowledged and addressed, even if those victims
cannot be made whole. Depending on the design of the amends making
process, soldiers might have an opportunity to directly express their remorse
and participate in amends making events.281
3. Reinforce Military Professionalism
The United States and many other states embrace military
professionalism as a way to discipline soldiers, achieve their military ends, and
promote restraint in conflict and other settings. 282 States grant militaries a near
monopoly over the "management of violence" in armed conflict.283 In
exchange, they rely on military culture 284 and military codeS 285 to ensure
278. Litz et al., supra note 256, at 701.
279. Id.
280. Wenzel et al., supra note 274; see also Thomas P. Carpenter et al., Tipping the Scales:
Conciliatory Behavior and the Morality of Self-Forgiveness, 9 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 389 (2014)
(finding that conciliatory behavior-including apologizing, making amends, offering restitution, and
seeking forgiveness-increases self-forgiveness); Goodstein et al., supra note 173, at 26, 30 (finding
that making amends can result in the maintenance or enhancing of "values, character, and standards,"
self-forgiveness, self-respect, and self-improvement). Research has also found that people tend to regret
instances in which they have failed to apologize more than they regret instances in which they have
offered apologies. Julie Juola Exline et al., Is Apology Worth the Risk? Predictors, Outcomes, and Ways
to Avoid Regret, 26 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 479, 488-90, 497-99 (2007).
281. See infra text accompanying notes 381-383.
282. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBURG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 6
(1992) (noting that militaries' professionalization was partially a response to the governance problems
raised by those militaries that "lived off the land and disrupted the lives of civilians in the lands they
occupied"). States have ever-increasing reasons to care about professionalism as militaries often perform
a variety of other functions besides their traditional combat role. Samuel Huntington, Keynote: Non-
Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military, in NON-COMBAT ROLES FOR THE U.S. MILITARY IN THE POST-
COLD WAR ERA 1, 5 (James R. Graham ed., 1994); Alan Vick et al., Preparing the U.S. Airforce for
Military Operations Other than War, RAND 10 (1997), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/monograph-reports/MR842/MR842.chap2.pdf (noting that the United States Air Force has participated
in 338 military operations other than wars between 1916 and 1996). In fact, during emergencies, soldiers
may be asked to move quickly between combat and noncombat roles. John R. Galvin, Final Thoughts:
Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military, in NON-COMBAT ROLES FOR THE U.S. MILITARY IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA 114 (James R. Graham ed., 1994).
283. Samuel Huntington, Officership as a Profession, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY
PROFESSION 11, 16 (Malham Wakin ed., 1979) (attributing this phrase to Harold Lasswell).
284. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 9 (1957). For all professions, this includes the belief that "to be a
professional is to make a moral commitment, a commitment to use one's skills and knowledge, in part at
least for the society's wellbeing." Paul R. Camenisch, On Being a Professional, Morally Speaking, in
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soldiers respect this deep societal responsibility. 286 The ensuing military
professionalism serves a vital function-it binds individual soldiers to the
collective interest.28 7 in so doing, it enables soldiers to cooperate with and trust
one another in the most difficult of circumstanceS 288 and encourages them to
follow rules even when those rules seem counterintuitive or
counterproductive.2 89
Part of what constitutes modem military professionalism is a belief that
military careers are honorable290 and that the moral underpinning of soldiers'
killings distinguishes their acts from "mere butchery." 291 In order to maintain
this worldview, soldiers must believe that their rules are rooted in an ethical
humanity and a culture of civilian protection. 292 The principle of distinction
which allows intentional targeting of combatants, but forbids the targeting of
non-combatants is an example. The principle of distinction makes killing less
repugnant 293 because it is restrained.294 But as non-traditional conflicts bring an
increasing number of civilian deaths, soldiers need to know they are acting not
just lawfully, but also ethically.
Making amends for lawful harm may reinforce this sense of
professionalism. In particular, making amends is consistent with the principle
of humanity embodied in IHL.295 While humanity in armed conflict is an
MORAL RESPONStBILITY IN THE PROFESSIONs 42, 49 (Bernard Baumrin & Benjamin Freedman eds.,
1983).
285. See Ernest Greenwood, Attributes of a Profession, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
PROFESSIONS 20, 23 (Bernard Baumrin & Benjamin Freedman eds., 1983).
286. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 284, at 9; see also Camenisch, supra note 284, at 49.
287. See Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, in MORAL RESPONStILITY
IN THE PROFESSIONS 33, 38-39 (Bernard Baumrin & Benjamin Freedman eds., 1983).
288. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 89 (1991); see also John
Winthrop Hackett, Society and the Soldier, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 79, 81
(Malham Wakin ed., 1979).
289. Kutz, supra note 101, at 167.
290. MORRS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 107 (1960).
291. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 102 (2006) ("Military professionals the world
over are emboldened by the confidence that what they do on the battlefield, in war, should be judged by
different standards, tested by different rules, than what they do at home with their families, when their
communities are at peace ... For the military, legitimacy and virtue are measured by the law in war
alone."); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WAR 45 (1977) (noting military personnel see the laws
of war as "limits and restraints that distinguish their life's work from mere butchery").
292. KENNEDY, supra note 291, at 103 ("[The traditional law continues to be useful to cabin
and channel the effort, discipline the troops, and preserve the boundaries of professional expertise and
responsibility. . . . The classic law continues to express-and channel-ethical sensibility. There may
be no military reason for wanton violence, but human sentiment also calls out for humane treatment
when one is no longer able to pursue the professional mission to destroy the enemy."); Adam Roberts,
The Laws of War: Problems ofImplementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
11, 76 (1995).
293. Baldwin, supra note 258, at 12.
294. Michael Newton contends that "[tlhe law of armed conflict emerged as the benchmark for
military professionalism because its precepts restrain the application of raw power and bloodlust even in
the midst of chaos, mind-numbing fear and overwhelming uncertainty. The law of war is integral to the
very notion of professionalism because it defines the class of persons against whom professional
military forces can lawfully apply violence based on principles of military necessity and reciprocity."
Michael Newton, Modern Military Necessity: The Role & Relevance of Military Lawyers, 12 ROGER
WIL. U. L. REv. 877, 902 (2007).
295. The Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land provides: "Until a
more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient
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amorphous concept, in practice, it has meant that the means and methods of
warfare are not unlimited, combatants must distinguish between combatants
and civilians, and civilians should be protected as such.296 Amends might be
viewed as minimizing the effects of warfare on civilians when the population
cannot be wholly spared from military operations. In this sense, amends could
be characterized as an ex post protection to add to the existing range of mostly
ex ante protections of civilians. 297
Moreover, making amends could signal to soldiers that their institution
behaves, not just legally, but also with honor and compassion. They could
distinguish themselves from murderous thugs, because they and their
institutions recognize the impact of their behavior on innocent parties and take
some action to redress it. Responses to civilian casualties could serve as a
source of and reinforcement for the military's shared morality by expiating the
immorality of unlawful killings and the moral taint of lawful killings. Even
more broadly, taking responsibility for having caused harm provides an
opportunity for learning for both individuals and organizations. 298 And
apologizing can have positive effects on group morale more generally. 299
to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience." Convention II, supra note 24, Preamble.
296. See Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 83 (2000).
297. See generally Holewinski, supra note 105, at 318 (describing amends as "a logical
extension of civilian protection mores").
298. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, supra note 187, at 944; see also Jonathan R. Cohen,
Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example From Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
1447, 1464-68 (1999) [hereinafter Cohen, Apology and Organizations].
299. Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 298, at 1473-74 (describing the pride
experienced by employees of a hospital that responds to medical error with apology).
166
Designing Amends for Lawful Civilian Casualties
Table 4: Potential Justifications for Amends
BENEFICIARY CONCERN MECHANISM
Foreign Victims Suffering Acknowledge Loss
Desire for Information Provide Explanation
Financial Needs Give Compensation
Prevent Future Harm Facilitate Learning
Dignity Respectful Treatment
Foreign Anger/Injustice Demonstrate Respect
Communities
Perpetuating Moral Injury Facilitate Self-Forgiveness
Soldiers
Military Hearts and Minds Reinforce Moral Position




We propose a redesign of condolence and solatia efforts that aims to
better satisfy the broad range of supply and demand-side needs. In particular,
we offer some preliminary suggestions in the areas of acknowledgment of harm
and promises of forbearance and non-repetition. We emphasize that designers
must account for the cultures of both the providers and the recipients as well as
concerns related to who offers and who receives amends.
A few preliminary matters are worth nothing. We propose amends as an
extension of or a reinagining of the existing condolence or solatia program. As
with these existing programs, the focus of amends is on civilians, not
combatants nor the JIL category of "civilians directly participating in
hostilities."30 0 This may place the state in the unenviable position of offering
300. Combatants, by virtue of their status, and civilians directly participating in hostilities, by
virtue of their current behavior, present a direct risk to service members. See supra note 51. Civilians, by
contrast, present no direct threat. Amends, therefore, ought to be offered regardless of whether harm to
civilians was a known risk, a certainty, or the result of a mistake in identity. For instance, if a soldier
mistakenly, but reasonably, invoked his right to self-defense, believing a civilian was a combatant or
participating in hostilities though the person was not, such a person would be entitled to amends. If a
civilian was confused by a checkpoint and continued to drive through and was killed but subsequent
investigation revealed the driver to be a civilian, amends would be paid. In contrast, a civilian who
decided to act as a lookout for an armed group and was killed as part of an attack on an armed group's
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amends to the families of civilians who are not directly participating in
hostilities, but who are nonetheless supportive of the enemy.301  This is
appropriate and not a departure from the status quo. Such persons are
considered to be civilians under IHL and should be treated as such.30 2
Similarly, nothing about our proposed amends design would alter a
soldier's right to self-defense or a commander's lawful range of actions,3 03 as a
requirement to provide amends does not change the legal framework governing
the military behavior that leads to the need for amends. Of course, one of the
purposes of amends is to reduce harm in situations in which the use of force is
necessary. It is possible that knowledge of an amends program could cause
soldiers to voluntarily restrict their exercise of force or for commanders to
adopt rules of engagement restricting their exercise of force." Such limitations
are appropriate. "[S]ervicemembers executing military operations act in a
public, not a personal, capacity. As such, defensive use-of-force rules for the
military should be grounded in the domestic and human rights law governing
the use of force by state actors, reflected in the public authority doctrine, not
general principles of individual self-defense."30 '
It is also worth noting that condolence payments or solatia should not be
viewed as the exclusive effort to address the needs of individuals and
communities. Larger scale efforts may be needed as well. Accordingly, we do
not view this proposed form of amends making as a substitute for other
counterinsurgency efforts. Relatedly, amends ought not be limited to those
instances in which militaries possess counterinsurgency goals. While the
supply-side needs may be lessened in such instances, the moral injury and
professionalism concerns are present in all types of conflicts, and the demand-
side needs are just as significant.
Finally, redesigned condolence or solatia programs ought not be used as
an alternative to legal redress for unlawful civilian deaths. 306 While amends
might be a preferable second best to no response at all, they are not an effective
compound is a civilian directly participating in hostilities and not entitled to amends. See, e.g., U.S.
NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS ch. 8.2.2 (July 2007).
301. For instance, financiers and propagandists are not classified as combatants and would,
therefore, be entitled to amends. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 34(May 2009).
302. In such situations, the appropriate sanction, if any, for sympathizing with the enemy is
criminal prosecution, to the extent that such support rises to the level of a crime. See supra note 17.
303. See Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, § 5(a).
304. Empirical research is needed to more carefully assess the potential impacts of making
amends on service member attitudes and behavior. It is possible that amends might lead to an increased
use of force if service members view the compensation part of amends as a tax that drains the act of
civilian killing of its moral stigma. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2000). The expectation that amends will be made could also serve to license less moral
conduct. See Jessica Cascio & E. Ashby Plant, Prospective Moral Licensing: Does Anticipating Doing
Good Later Allow You To Be Bad Now?, 56 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 110, I 1 (2015); Benoit
Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001). However, we suspect that the other components of amends, such as personal
apologies and data assessment, would tip the balance toward a decreased use of force.
305. Coin, supra note 54, at 7.
306. See supra note 17.
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alternative to a functional military criminal justice system that punishes
wrongdoers in appropriate instances. 307
A. Systematization and Reporting
The first wave of suggestions for reforming amends practices in the
military setting focused on recognizing a duty to compensate, systematizing the
provision of payments, providing adequate compensation, and improving
reporting and transparency. Some scholars and non-governmental organizations
have argued that international law ought to make state payments mandatory for
all civilians injured by foreign armed forces-even when those injuries are
caused lawfully.30 8 They root these arguments in morality, the logic of tort law,
and pragmatic concern that the needs of victims might not be satisfied in the
absence of a binding legal duty. States, including the United States,309 however,
have thus far strongly resisted efforts any efforts to make such payments
obligatory under international law. 310 Given the existing reluctance of states to
accept such a duty under international law, some NGOs have reframed their
objectives away from required cash payments toward measures that focus on
"ensuring greater attentiveness and recognition of civilian concerns and harm,
making apologies, and providing other forms of assistance as necessary and
according to what is deemed culturally appropriate." 3 11
Others, rather than focusing on any international legal duty, have
emphasized the importance of more uniform provision of payments and more
consistency in the amounts paid to those who qualify. 312 For instance, one study
307. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, for example, cautioned against
condolence payments as a substitute for adjudicating and repairing harm caused in ways that contravene
legal strictures:
1 note the emerging practice of several States, one that other parties to armed conflict might
consider, of acknowledging the harm they cause to civilians and compensating victims. The
practice of making amends may be provided to individuals, families and communities. This
practice must not be seen, however, as an alternative to prosecuting those responsible for
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and delivering justice to the
victims and their families and communities.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, 1 93 U.N. Doc S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010) (emphasis added).
308. For instance, in 2011, CIVIC called on the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to count and compensate civilians harmed by drones. Press Release,
CIVIC, Civilian Drone Victims Deserve to Be Counted and Compensated (Mar. 24, 2011). See
generally Scott T. Paul, The Duty to Make Amends to Victims ofArmed Conflict, 22 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 87, 106 (2013) (arguing for compensation and recognition); W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons
of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 381, 397-98 (1997) (describing how a tort liability might be structured in
this context including the possibility of strict liability); Ronen, supra note 38 (describing the benefits of
a strict liability approach to compensation in this setting).
309. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF
WAR MANUAL 269 (2015).
310. CHARLI CARPENTER, LOST CAUSES: AGENDA VETTING IN GLOBAL ISSUE NETWORKS AND
THE SHAPING OF HUMAN SECURITY 57 (2014).
311. Gilbert, The Gift of War: Cash, Counterinsurgency, and 'Collateral Damage', SECURITY
DIALOGUE 1, 11 (2015).
312. Rogers, supra note 19, at 13-14; see also Jeffrey S. Palmer, Claims Encountered During
an Operational Contingency, 42 AIR FORCE L. REV. 227, 238-39 (1997) (suggesting solatia should
always be paid when locals have a tradition of payment); Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for
Harm Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. J. 335, 362-64 (2003)
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found that the Taliban did a far better job approaching those who self-identified
as suffering Taliban victimization than the coalition forces did in approaching
its victims.313 Moreover, there is evidence that even when the United States
approves a payment, it often fails to disburse the funds. 314 And for those who
receive payments, the amount of money provided for similar harms can vary
significantly across potentially irrelevant dimensions like gender and
geographic location.i' While caps on payments exist, "the valuation of
amounts is determined on an ad hoc basis with no clear valuation calculus." 316
In order to facilitate improvements here, some have argued for improved
casualty reporting 317 and greater transparency of payments.318
Though we support efforts to expand coverage and provide more
consistent and coherent payments,3 19 and hope that President Obama's
Executive Order may prompt improvement in this regard, we caution that the
overwhelming focus on standardization might obscure or even undermine other
aspects of amends. As explained above, amends are about the recognition of a
relationship between the injurer and the injured, the acknowledgement of the
significance of the individual who was injured, and the reinforcement of a
shared set of values or norms. Thus, conceiving of the endeavor to systematize
the amends making process as striving to provide a standardized insurance-like
type of payment risks limiting the process's ability to achieve either its supply-
or demand-side objectives. We noted earlier the reactions of recipients to the
impersonal letters that accompanied symbolic emotional harm payments in
Belgium and the concern that routinization of condolence payments can lead to
a lack of sensitivity to victim needs, undermining responsiveness in a way that
can be counterproductive.32 0
(discussing the merits of permanent versus ad hoc systems of state-based compensation for victims of
terrorism); Witt, supra note Ill , at 1477; Ex-gratia Payments in Afghanistan: A Case for Standing
Policy for the US. Military, CIVIC (2015) [hereinafter Ex gratia Payments].
313. Lyall et al., supra note 160, at 693 (observing over 60% of those identifying as Taliban
victims reported being approached as compared to only 16% of those identifying as victims of coalition
forces).
314. Exgratia Payments, supra note 312.
315. Id. at 3-5.
316. van Dijken et al., supra note 93, at 5.
317. The Count Every Casualty campaign, which emphasizes the importance of "recognition of
victims," suggests that mandatory casualty accounting might be used to facilitate compensation. Jacob
Beswick & Elizabeth Minor, Casualty Recording, in ACKNOWLEDGE, AMEND, ASSIST: ADDRESSING
CIVILIAN HARM CAUSED BY ARMED CONFLICT AND ARMED VIOLENCE 4, 7 (Apr. 2015),
https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AcknowledgeAmendAssist.pdf.
318. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 165, at 54-55 (requesting improved
reporting practices to allow better assessment of payments and the Department of Defense's affirmative
response).
319. An additional "standardization" issue may arise when multiple states' forces are present
and have different amends practices. For a general discussion of how states might cope with divergence,
see Wexler, supra note 150.
320. See supra notes 236-238 and accompanying text. Consider, too, the context of "necessary
evils" in business settings. Margolis & Molinsky, supra note 271, at 867-68. Joshua Margolis and
Andrew Molinsky find that because engaging in tasks that are thought of as necessary evils is so
difficult, "organizations tend to focus on standard operating procedures and carefully scripted routines."
These strict protocols can be helpful, they argue, in helping individuals to weather the unpleasantness of
the required task and in ensuring attention to certain aspects of interpersonal understanding. At the same
time, however, such routinization can be a barrier to the kind of engaged, personalized interaction that
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The measures that can best communicate the recognition that victims
seek, for example, may vary from case to case:
But exactly what constitutes recognition for those who have been harmed varies
tremendously. Is it satisfied by pressing the hand of a dignitary? Receiving an
official condolence letter? Hearing an apology? Can money or medical treatment be
sufficient? Do victims require press coverage? Information? An explanation? What
about a name on a commemorative plaque? A monument? A place of honor at a
memorial service? Victims might find any or all these constructive and appropriate
recognition at one time or another, and might also find that each offering fails to
fulfill the deep need to have one's loss and self acknowledged. 32 1
Processes that allow for some individual variation in what constitutes
fitting amends and that allow for responsiveness to victims' individual
situations might best serve the underlying need for appropriate
acknowledgement held by victims, communities, and military personnel. The
challenge, of course, is achieving such individuation within the military's
economic, expediency, and competency constraints. While a high degree of
tailoring may be infeasible, we identify some important components that should
inform the process.
Though it is unlikely that compensation will be made compulsory under
international law in this context, the U.S. policy decision to make condolence
payments mandatory under domestic rules provides an opportunity to influence
the ways in which the United States responds to lawful harm as well as the
practices of other states that look to the United States for guidance. We
therefore stress the importance of conceptualizing these programs as amends
and constructing them as such, rather than viewing them as a means by which
to make a gift or provide charity to the victims.322 As we emphasized in Part II,
much of what drives the desire for amends is a need for respect and fair
treatment and the notion of some measure of equality. Conceiving of amends as
acts of pure beneficence may drain them of their needed meaning.3 23 Providing
amends as part of a binding domestic process may help to ensure this
distinction. 324
B. Substance ofAmends
Given the needs of both victims and the military, an effective amends
program should provide more than a monetary condolence payment.
325
might make amends the most effective. Id. (arguing that "[e]ven as companies provide the standard
policies and practices for ensuring a basic level of sensitive interpersonal treatment, they might also find
ways to enable personalized responses").
321. HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 44.
322. See Gilbert, supra note 311, at415.
323. Whether, how, and to what extent conceiving of amends as purely beneficent changes the
meaning ascribed to them by victims, military actors, or the public are empirical questions that are worth
further study.
324. This is particularly so if the domestic rules require acknowledgement of the state's causal
responsibility and processes to prevent repetition. See infra Sections fll.C-D.
325. Yet the recent Executive Order says nothing about the process by which condolence
payments are to be made nor does it emphasize the individual-level need to give and receive amends.
See Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27; Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order
on the U.S. Policy on Pre & Post Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in the U.S. Operations
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Reparative measures that also focus on the provision of acknowledgment,
information, sympathy, and concern for future behavior may be able to more
effectively address victims' desire for acknowledgement, respect, explanation,
and meaning. At the same time, a broader conception of amends may better
address the needs of the military for support in the relevant local community,
the easing of moral suffering among military personnel, and the emphasis of
professionalism.326 The challenge for designers, of course, is how to ensure a
robust system of amends, while simultaneously recognizing practical concerns
such as safety, security, expediency, and competency.
In particular, the design of programs for making amends ought to
accommodate victims' desire for acknowledgement and accountability. 327 In
the context of harm to civilians occasioned by lawful military conduct,
however, we would not expect the military to accept legal responsibility for
having caused the harm or to make a statement that the behavior that led to the
harm was unlawful.328 We might, however, plausibly expect the taking of
causal responsibility-that is, an acknowledgement that the military has acted
in a way that has caused harm. 32 9 Intuitively recognizing some aspect of this
distinction, one veteran who struggled with the need to make amends for
having killed civilians noted that "I want to apologize, but not for my
actions .... It's not an apology for my actions. I just want to show them that I
recognize the sacrifice that they put up." 330 Obama's Executive Order suggests
a willingness for the U.S. government to acknowledge its role,331 but offers no
implementation guidance. We suggest that acknowledgment should be explicit
and provided directly to family members.
Involving the Use of Force and the DNI Release of Aggregate Data on Strike Outside Area of Active
Hostilities, WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 2016); Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, WHITE
HOUSE (July 1, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/press-briefing-press-
secretary-josh-eamest-712016.
326. See generally Alfred Allan et al., Apologies Following an Adverse Medical Event: The
Importance of Focusing on the Consumer's Needs, 98 PAT[ENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 1058, 1060-61
(2015) (finding that more complex apologies were perceived as more sincere and as expressing more
sorriness); Scher & Darley, supra note 182 (finding that each component of an apology contributes to a
more effective apology with more elaborate apologies generating more positive effects); Schmitt et al.,
supra note 182 (supporting the same proposition).
327. See supra Section II.A.I.
328. Indeed, claims cards used by the army in Iraq "assert that 'this information is NOT an
admission of liability by the soldiers involved and will be used only to substantiate a claim against the
US Army', and caution 'Do not promise them anything."' Gilbert, supra note 311, at 411. For
discussions of whether to provide legal protection for apologies in the domestic setting and, if so, to
what extent, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819
(2002); Heimreich, supra note 187; Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, What's an Apology Worth?
Decomposing the Effect of Apologies on Medical Malpractice Payments Using State Apology Laws, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 179 (2011); John C. Kleefeld, Thinking Like a Human: British Columbia's
Apology Act, 40 U.B.C. L. REv. 769 (2007); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology, 109 YALE L. J. 1135 (2000); Prue Vines, Apologising To Avoid Liability: Cynical Civility or
Practical Morality?, 27 SYDNEY L. REv. 483 (2005).
329. While the recent Executive Order does require the United States to "acknowledge U.S.
government responsibility," there is no current requirement that the United States explain the cause of a
death or injury to the family or to the public. Knuckey, supra note 31.
330. Filkins, supra note 261, at 13.
331. See Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27.
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Similarly, processes aimed at making amends ought to take into account
victims' and soldiers' need to believe that appropriate steps will be taken to
avoid unnecessary harm in the future. Even if the civilian deaths were legally
permissible, self-criticism and reflection are appropriate when one has harmed
another.332 Approaching the review of a situation in which civilians are killed
or injured with a mindset focused on growth-the desire to improve and learn
from mistakes-can communicate respect for those who are injured as well as
for the community in which the incident took place. 333 While a promise to
eliminate future civilian casualties may not be feasible,334 the military can
reasonably promise to learn from its actions.
Such review efforts might be rooted in the existing practice of engaging
in individual "after action reports." The U.S. military already conducts
individual assessments of civilian casualty incidents for internal purposes 335
and President Obama's Executive Order requires a review or investigation of
all incidents involving civilian casualties. 336 We recommend such reports
include a discussion of why the civilian casualties occurred. In turn, when
possible, the amends process might include informing parties about what
happened and if circumstances permit,337 what, if anything, went amiss, as well
what efforts might be taken to avoid similar casualties in the future.338 The
332. See Heimreich, supra note 187, at 582 (arguing that "self-criticism is an appropriate way
to assess having harmed someone else, even blamelessly" and that "expressing self-criticism, including
to the victim, does not imply that one takes oneself to be legally or morally culpable in the harm done").
But see id. at 588 n.86 ("This characterization may invite an obvious counterexample: the case of
justified harms, in which the efforts succeeded, and are above reproach even in hindsight (such as an
operation that caused a minor injury to save a life). In these cases, even if apologies are due, I find it less
clear that they would appropriately be self-critical.").
333. See generally Karina Schumann & Carol S. Dweck, Who Accepts Responsibility for Their
Transgressions?, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1598 (2014) (finding that people who
believe that personal characteristics and abilities are malleable and can be changed-that is, they hold a
growth mindset-are more likely to view the accepting of responsibility for having caused harm as an
opportunity for learning and are more likely to apologize).
334. That said, the Obama Administration has publicly manifested an aim for zero civilian
casualties in the War on Terror. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National
Defense University (May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university (stating that "before any strike is taken, there must be near-
certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured-the highest standard we can set."). At least some
evidence suggests its implementation in the context of drone strikes. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret
'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama 's Principles and Will: Taking a Personal Role in War on Al Qaeda,
N.Y. TIMEs (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-
al-qaeda.html (discussing Obama's personal oversight of the war with Al Qaeda); Kristina Wong, US
Aim for 'Zero Civilian Casualties' Draws Criticism, THE HILL (June 24, 2015, 06:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/defenselpolicy-strategy/245932-us-aims-for-zero-civilian-casualties-in-war-vs-
isis (discussing significant limitations on ISIS targets to avoid any civilian casualties).
335. For instance, in Afghanistan, civilian casualty events generate two information reports to
the regional command and a third investigation information report for the legal adviser if the incident
resulted in a civilian death. Condra et al., supra note 244, at 9 n. 10.
336. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, § 2(b)(i).
337. Commanders or others in the military may be best situated to make a determination of the
level of detail that can be shared without compromising strategies, future missions or intelligence
sources. Designers may, however, want to provide some sort of standard against which such practical
concerns can be measured.
338. The United States already conducts such assessments, but it does not seem that anything
about them, including their existence, is conveyed to the families. For instance, did the operation rely on
faulty intelligence or would a better pattern of life assessment have avoided the civilian casualties; could
the weapon chosen have been more discriminate or could force have been avoided entirely? See
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United States has shown itself willing to share this level of detail in high profile
cases,339 but we suggest that this reporting become the norm. That said, the
cause(s) of civilian casualties and possible efforts to avoid a repeat of similar
casualties will not always be clear even after a single individual after action
report. Used in isolation, such reports cannot always reveal patterns or
systematic problems.
Therefore, we also recommend that the U.S. military utilize more
systematic tracking. The U.S. military has already successfully deployed fairly
basic tracking methods to address escalation of force issues in Iraq, reducing
casualties from night raids and traffic stops.340 Civilian Casualty Tracking
Analysis and Response (CCTAR) cells, which are used to enhance operations
in Afghanistan 341 and Somalia and are recommended as a best practice,3 42
present an even more sophisticated approach.343 Rather than relying solely on
internal sources of data such as formal and informal reporting chains among
troops, CCTAR cells also gather data from "external sources such as civil
society, hospitals, and the media" as well as from an incident assessment team
that can gather additional data from the field.34 CCTAR can help identify both
potential recipients of amends and concrete steps for minimizing future
casualties through training, escalation of force protocols, and rules of
engagement.3 45 We recommend that such tracking efforts be incorporated into
the Obama Executive Order's call for periodic consultation among high-level
generally LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 472-
73 (2013) (criticizing the United States' reliance on satellite phones that produced inaccurate
coordinates and did not guarantee the identity of the user); Cora Currier & Peter Maass, Firing Blind:
Flawed Intelligence and the Limits of Drone Technology, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:58 AM),
https:/theintercept.com/drone-papers/firing-blind/ (discussing "critical shortfalls" in the technology and
intelligence used in drones).
339. For example, after the Kunduz hospital bombing, the United States identified a
combination of factors that contributed to the bombing, including difficulty with the gunship's targeting
instruments and the failure to provide a full prestrike briefing that could have included a no-strike list.
Joseph Goldstein & Eric Schmitt, Report Cites Human Error in Airstrike on Hospital, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/asia/doctors-without-borders-hospital-kunduz-
afghanistan.html.
340. General Stanley McChrystal, a former commander in Afghanistan, focused on identifying
trends and setting new policies to reduce civilian casualties. This resulted in policies such as directing
soldiers to stop driving aggressively in traffic and limiting the use of night raids. While McChrystal
implemented two separate sets of enhanced escalation of force measures, data reveal that the second set
(which standardized procedures to stop vehicles including the use of laser dazzler, and reiterated that
warning and disabling shots were to be used only as a last resort) were effective in reducing casualties.
LARRY LEWIS, REDUCING AND MITIGATING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: ENDURING LESSONS, JOINT &
COALITION OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 2 (2013); MarIa B. Keenan, Operationalizing Civilian Protection
in Mali: The Case for a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell, 2 STABILITY: INT'L J.
SEC. & DEV. 1, 3-4 (2010).
341. Forces were able to decrease the civilian casualties including those caused by air strikes.
John Bohannon, Counting the Dead in Afghanistan, 331 SCI. 1256, 1257 (2011). JENNIFER KEENE,
CIVILIAN HARM TRACKING: ANALYSIS OF ISAF EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN (2014),
http://www.youblisher.com/p/937087-Civilian-Harm-Tracking-Analysis-of-ISAF-Efforts-in-
Afghanistan/.
342. Jacob Beswick & Elizabeth Minor, The UN. and Casualty Recording: Good Practice and
the Need for Action, OXFORD RES. GP. 5 (2014) (advocating casualty tracking for all military forces in
conflict settings).
343. Keenan, supra note 340, at 5.
344. Id. at 2; Bohannon, supra note 341, at 1257-60.
345. KEENE, supra note 341, at 8-9; Keenan, supra note 340, at 8.
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agency officials on civilian casualty trends,3 46 that they become normal practice
and part of mission planning,347 and that the existence of such assessments be
conveyed to affected parties, including victims, communities, and military
personnel.
For such assessments to be truly effective, the military must follow up on
them by designing policies around the lessons of the individual and systematic
information gathered. For instance, after the incident in which the U.S. military
ran over two girls in a training exercise, 348 the military increased safety by
briefing all soldiers on the incident as well as "inspect[ing] vehicles, add[ing]
safety mirrors and develop[ing] new planning and operating procedures." 349 To
the extent that it would not compromise security or effectiveness, such efforts
should be communicated back to the victims and their communities.
C. Culture
In the context of military condolence payments, U.S. actors are almost
always operating across cultural divides of varying degrees that can complicate
the offering and receiving of payments, apologies, and other aspects of amends.
Cultures may differ across a variety of dimensions, such as the extent to which
members of the culture see themselves as independent or interdependent; 350 the
extent to which members of the culture define their worth by what others think
(face cultures), whether self-worth is intrinsic (dignity cultures), or whether
self-worth is defined both internally and externally (honor cultures); 351 the
extent to which communication is indirect and highly dependent on context for
meaning (high-context) or explicit, direct, and understandable without
reference to the context in which the communication occurs (low-context); 352
the comfort that members of the culture have with hierarchical authorities as
compared to more consultative authority; 353 and the degree to which members
346. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, § 4.
347. KEENE, supra note 341, at 22.
348. See supra notes 123-127.
349. Slavin, supra note 123.
350. See Marilynn B. Brewer & Masaki Yuki, Culture and Social Identity, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 307, 311 (Shinobu Kitayama & Dov Cohen eds., 2007); Joseph A. Vandello &
Dov Cohen, Patterns of Individualism and Collectivism Across the United States, 77 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1999).
351. Soroush Aslani et al., Dignity, Face, and Honor Cultures: Implications for Negotiation
and Conflict Management, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION 249 (Mara Olekalns &
Wendi L. Adair eds., 2013); Young-Hoon Kim & Dov Cohen, Information, Perspective, and Judgments
About the Self in Face and Dignity Cultures, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 537, 537-38
(2010); Angela K.-Y. Leung & Dov Cohen, Within- and Between-Culture Variation: Individual
Diferences and the Cultural Logics of Honor, Face, and Dignity Cultures, 100 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 507 (2011).
352. EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 105 (1976); see also lhyung Lee, The Law and
Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2005).
353. This dimension is referred to as "power distance." GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES 65 (1989); Tom R. Tyler
et al., Cultural Values and Authority Relations: The Psychology ofConflict Resolution Across Cultures,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1138, 1140 (2000).
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of the culture focus on reactive fault.354 Cultures also differ in their language
rules, emotional display rules, and facework rules in ways that can affect
conflict and amends interactions. 55 Thus, in cross-cultural contexts, amends
processes should account for the differing roles of family, kinship, community,
and tribal structures; approaches to conflict and conflict resolution;
communication styles; religion; conceptions of forgiveness; orientations toward
honor or shame; and rituals.356
Cultural differences in views of the self may influence the relative
importance that amends recipients place on different components of the
interaction. For example, one recent study found that those who emphasized an
independent self cared more about compensation; those who emphasized a
relational self cared more about expressions of empathy; and those who
emphasized the collective self cared more about acknowledgement of rule
violation.357 Understanding these differences can help draw attention to
divergences in views about the need to focus on each of these components.
In addition, the components of amends may elicit differing responses
from recipients across cultures. Take, for example, apologies. Overall, evidence
demonstrates that apologies are useful across cultures.358 At the same time,
however, while there is much underlying similarity, different cultures tend to
construct and interpret apologies in different ways. As one set of researchers
has noted, when it comes to apologies, "it seems that virtually every culture has
its own rules."359 For example, apologies offered by Arabic and Persian
speakers tend to be more elaborate and are more likely to include intensifiers,
354. Braithwaite & Roche, supra note 188, at 72-73 (arguing that "[w]estem criminal justice
systems (such as that of the United States) are at the causal end of the continuum; Asian systems (such
as that of Japan) tend to be at the reactive end").
355. See David Matsumoto, Cultural Similarities and Diferences in Display Rules, 14
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 195 (1990) (discussing emotional display rules); David Matsumoto et al.,
Mapping Expressive Differences Around the World: The Relationship Between Emotional Display Rules
and Individualism vs. Collectivism, 39 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 55 (2008); Hong Ren & Barbara
Gray, Repairing Relationship Conflict: How Violation Types and Culture Influence the Effectiveness of
Restoration Rituals, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 105 (2009) (discussing cultural influences on conflict
resolution); Saba Safdar et al., Variations of Emotional Display Rules Within and Across Cultures: A
Comparison Between Canada, USA, and Japan, 41 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCL 1 (2009) (discussing emotional
display rules).
356. George E. Irani, Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts, 3 MIDDLE E.
REV. INT'L AFFS. 2 (1999); Irani & Funk, supra note 200 (describing the ritual of suhi and ceremony of
reconciliation (musalaha) as "forms of interaction that are both culturally legitimate and symbolically
powerful"); Wagatsuma & Roset, supra note 219.
357. See Blatz et al., supra note 173, at 237 ("What matters . .. is not incorporating every
element of an apology, but rather addressing the specific demands and psychological needs of those
receiving the apology."); Ryan Fehr & Michele J. Gelfand, When Apologies Work: How Matching
Apology Components to Victims' Self-Construals Facilitates Forgiveness, 113 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 37, 40 (2010).
358. See, e.g., Ritsu Itoi et al., A Cross-Cultural Study of Preference of Accounts: Relationship
Closeness, Harm Severity, and Motives of Account Making, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 913 (1996)
(comparing U.S. and Japanese participants and finding that apology was most preferred by both groups);
Andy J. Merolla et al., Forgiveness in the United States and China: Antecedents, Consequences, and
Communication Style Comparisons, 40 COMM. RES. 595 (2012); Ohbuchi et al., supra note 224; Seiji
Takaku, Bernard Weiner, & Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi, A Cross-Cultural Examination of the Effects of Apology
andPerspective Taking on Forgiveness, 20 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 144 (2001).
359. William W. Maddux et al., Why "I'm Sorry" Doesn't Always Translate, HARv. BUS. REV.
(June 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/06/why-im-sorry-doesnt-always-translate.
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requests for pardon or forgiveness, repetition of apologetic elements,
expressions of self-deficiency, expressions of shame, and more references to
religious concepts as well as proverbs. 360
Similarly, there are cultural differences in whether and what sort of an
apology is expected and how apologies are understood.3 61 One key difference is
the extent to which an apology is seen as an admission of guilt, with some
cultures (like the United States) tending to focus on culpability and to interpret
apologies as admissions and other cultures tending to focus more on amends for
the consequences of the injurious event. One study, for example, found that
U.S. participants were more likely to interpret an apology as implying guilt as
compared to Japanese participants who were less likely to think that the
apology would result in blaming. 362 To take one real-world example, consider
the following:
[I]n a recent military dispute between the U.S. and China, an expression of remorse
by the United States government for the death of a Chinese pilot was interpreted by
the Chinese government as an apology; however, the U.S. government vehemently
denied an apology had been made, with then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
remarking, "There is nothing to apologize for. To apologize would have suggested
that we have accepted responsibility for having done something wrong. And we did
not do anything wrong."3
Taking into account these cultural differences in the meaning of apologies
is crucial for the success of amends. This is particularly important in light of
the Obama Executive Order's pledge to maintain and promote civilian casualty
360. Abdul W. Al-Zumor, Apologies in Arabic and English: An Inter-Language and Cross-
Cultural Study, 23 J. KING SAUD UNIV. - LANG. & TRANSLATION 19 (2011); Rula Fahmi Bataineh &
Ruba Fahmi Bataineh, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Apologies by Native Speakers of American
English and Jordanian Arabic, 40 J. PRAGMATICS 792 (2008); Sohreh Eslami-Rasekh, Face-Keeping
Strategies in Reaction to Complaints: English and Persian, 14 J. ASIAN PAC. COMM. 181 (2004); Riyad
F. Hussain & Mamoun T. Hammouri, Strategies ofApology in Jordanian Arabic and American English,
49 GRAZER LINGUISTISCHE STUDIEN 37 (1998); see also Akbar Afghari, A Sociopragmatic Study of
Apology Speech Act Realization Patterns in Persian, 49 SPEECH COMM. 177 (2007); Fatima
Abdurahman Nureddeen, Cross Cultural Pragmatics: Apology Strategies in Sudanese Arabic, 40 J.
PRAGMATICS 279 (2008); Mohammad Shariati & Fariba Chamani, Apology Strategies in Persian, 42 J.
PRAGMATICS 1689 (2010). For comparisons across other cultures or languages see, e.g., Dean C.
Bamlund & Miho Yoshioka, Apologies: Japanese and American Style, 14 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL
REL. 193 (1990); Xiaowen Guan et al., Cross-Cultural Differences in Apology, 33 INT'L J.
INTERCULTURAL REL. 32 (2009) (comparing U.S., Chinese, and Korean apologies); Hee Sun Park &
Xiaowen Guan, Culture, Positive and Negative Face Threats, and Apology Intentions, 28 J. LANGUAGE
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 244 (2009) (comparing U.S. and Chinese apologies); Naomi Sugimoto, A Japan-U.S.
Comparison ofApology Styles, 24 COMM. RES. 349 (1997); Fay Wouk, The Language ofApologizing in
Lombok, Indonesia, 38 J. PRAGMATICS 1457 (2006).
361. See Etienne Mullet & Fabiola Azar, Apologies, Repentance, and Forgiveness: A Muslim-
Christian Comparison, 19 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. RELIGION 275, 282-83 (2009) (finding differences in
expectations and forgiveness between Muslim and Christian participants); ttoi et al., supra note 358
(finding that Japanese participants had greater expectations than an offender would apologize and lower
expectations that the offender would use a justification than U.S. participants).
362. William W. Maddux et al., Cultural Differences in the Function and Meaning ofApology,
16 INT'L NEGOT. 405, 412 (2011).
363. Id. at 410 (quoting Peter H. Gries & Kaiping Peng, Culture Clash? Apologies East and
West, 30 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 173 (2002)); see also HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 45 (recounting the
reaction when she inquired about "compensation" following the embassy bombings in Africa: "The U.S.
government is not going to provide compensation. Compensation connotes responsibility, and we are not
responsible for the bombings. We can only offer 'assistance."').
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best practices. 364 In doing so, the United States must be sensitive to differences
rather than simply replicating a single successful amends process in places with
varying cultural expectations. The ways in which compensation and other
forms of amends are coupled may also have different implications across
cultures. In cultures in which blood revenge is of concern, for example, "the
symbolic significance of compensation is at least as important as the substance
of the payment. The exchange of money or goods substitutes for the exchange
of death; the family that forsakes revenge gains in standing, while the family of
the murderer is humbled and indebted by this act of forbearance and
magnanimity." 365 In the Japanese cultural context, "[w]hen compensation or
damages are to be paid to the victim, it is extremely important that the person
responsible expresses to the victim his feeling of deep regret and apologizes, in
addition to paying an appropriate sum. If a person appears too willing to pay
the damages, that willingness may be taken as the sign of his lack of regret. He
may be regarded as thinking that money can settle anything and as not being
sincerely interested in restoring a positive relationship with his victim."3 66
Cultural differences may also have implications for who appropriately
gives and receives apologies. In more interdependent cultures, indirect
apologies given through or mediated by third parties-perhaps a tribal leader or
village elder-may be more acceptable than they would be in more
independent cultures. 367 In Arab-Islamic mediation, "the preferred 'third
party' . . . is an unbiased insider with ongoing connections to the major
disputants as well as a strong sense of the common good and standing within
the community (e.g., age, experience, status, leadership)." 368
Given the myriad ways in which culture can influence how amends are
given and received, designers of amends processes ought to think carefully
about the implications of culture for how condolence or solatia payments are
made within a given conflict, and the military personnel who are charged with
carrying out amends ought to be better trained in the nuances of amends, the
intricacies of culture, and the importance of ritual. Existing training that
focuses on the amount to be disbursed, process, roles, and responsibilities, 369
must be supplemented with an emphasis on the interpersonal and cultural
aspects of making amends.370
The military has already started to show sensitivity to the important role
of culture in counterinsurgencies. For instance, the U.S. military embedded
human terrain teams of anthropologists and other social scientists in
364. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note 27, § 1.
365. Irani & Funk, supra note 200, at 66.
366. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 219, at 472-73; see also LAZARE, supra note 222, at 34
("[C]ommunicating and receiving effective apologies to and from people of different cultures and
languages is a complex and challenging process that requires an understanding of a culture as well as the
precise use of language.").
367. See Ren & Gray, supra note 355, at 115.
368. Irani & Funk, supra note 200, at 63.
369. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-699, MLITARY OPERATIONS: THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN 32 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07699.pdf.
370. E-mail from Nick Dubaz, to Lesley M. Wexler (Sept. 12, 2015, 5:36 PM CST).
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Afghanistan and Iraq.371 Commanders have welcomed such experts and found
them helpful in providing training on basic customs and to a lesser extent on
tailoring message content as well.3 72
D. Legitimate Agents to Give and Receive Amends
A robust process of amends must also pay attention to who is engaged in
the process of making amends and to whom amends are offered. In instances of
civilians killed during armed conflict, many different people could be involved
in the amends making process. Who would victims like to make amends to
them? Who would value active engagement in the providing of amends? To
whom should amends be made?
1. Offered by Whom?
In many cases it is easy to identify the person who should properly make
amends. But in other instances, it can be difficult. In the case of the military's
lawful killing of a civilian, for example, amends could theoretically be offered
by a ground-level member of the military (the person who pulled the trigger or
the drone operator, for example), a commanding officer, the person who made
the decision to execute the particular strike or other activity, or the President of
the United States as the Commander in Chief. Given the nature of armed
conflict, often no one person is singularly causally responsible for a lawful
civilian death, but rather multiple persons all acting under the authority of the
state might be identified as causally responsible. 373 Amends making may need
to reflect that collective responsibility, even as aspects of amends-such as
apologies-must be performed by individuals.
Apologies on behalf of groups can be more complicated than those
offered by individuals. 374 But a number of studies have found that apologies
371. After seven years, this controversial program concluded in 2014. Whitney Kassel, The
Army Needs Anthropologists, FOREIGN POL'Y (July 28, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/the-
army-needs-anthropologists-iraq-afghanistan-human-terrain/. The criticisms largely focused on the
possible use of anthropologists' data to target suspected insurgents or to design propaganda campaigns
or other efforts at social control. See generally Roberto J. Gonzdlez, Embedded: Information Warfare
and the "Human Terrain," in THE COUNTER-COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL: OR, NOTES ON
DEMILITARIZING AMERICAN SOCIETY 97 (Network of Concerned Anthropologists et al. eds., 2009).
372. Christopher J. Lamb et al., The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams, 70 JOINT FORCES
Q. 21, 26 (2013).
373. Take the Kunduz Hospital bombing as a possible instance of causal, but not legal,
responsibility-taking. Spencer Ackerman & Sune Engel Rasmussen, Kunduz Hospital Attack: MSF s
Questions Remain as US Military Seeks No Charges, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/29/kunduz-hospital-attack-msf-us-military-charges
(noting the United States' conclusion that the strike was not a war crime). One might view the crew, the
person who sent the crew out without a briefing, those who failed to match the crew's strike coordinate
to the no-strike list at the operational headquarters, and those who failed to relay the hospital's call that
it was under attack to the crew, among others, as causally responsible. See Andrew Tilghman, C-130
Crew Blamed for Kunduz Hospital Attack, Top General Says, MIL. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/11/25/us-troops-suspended-kunduz-
hospital-attack-top-general-says/76371506/. However, system and procedural failures may reach beyond
these individuals. See id.
374. See generally, LAZARE, supra note 222, at 40 (noting the difficulties of identifying who
should speak for the group in a public apology); SMITH, supra note 226, at 207-21 (asserting that
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offered on behalf of groups or collective entities can be effective. In particular,
several studies have explored apologies offered by or to countries. In one study,
for example, researchers manipulated whether the United States apologized to
soldiers' families and the Canadian military for the friendly-fire deaths of four
Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan.37 5 Participants-residents of the Canadian
city in which the soldiers had been stationed prior to their deployment-felt
less need for revenge and more support for ongoing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan
following an apology.376 In a similar study, researchers explored Australians'
responses to apologies purportedly offered by several different offender
groups.3 7 7 Australian students who were told that the relevant group had
apologized were more satisfied with the group's response and perceived the
group to be more remorseful when an apology was offered as compared to
when no apology was given, though they were not more likely to forgive. 378
Anecdotal evidence, moreover, suggests that apologies given by group
leaders can be effective. 79 And studies have found that leaders tend to be held
more responsible than do followers, 3 o suggesting that an officer or commander
might effectively give an apology.
But there may be an appropriate role for ground-level soldiers to play in
making amends as well. Some soldiers might welcome the chance to express
sympathy to civilian victims or their families. As one veteran soldier noted, "I
think a lot of us want to see them and say we are sorry. We don't get that
chance."38' Whether the interaction comes via a face-to-face meeting or,
perhaps, though letters written by soldiers to victims,3 82 such acknowledgement
might be valued by victims and therapeutic for soldiers. For some soldiers who
are suffering from moral injury, mere knowledge of an amends process might
be sufficient; for others, some more direct participation might be valued. 383 Of
individuals must have "standing" to make collective apologies); NICHOLAS TAVRUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A
SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 96-98 (1993).
375. See Ryan P. Brown et al., Taking Up Offenses: Secondhand Forgiveness and Group
Identification, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1406 (2008).
376. Id. at 1409-10.
377. Catherine R. Philpot & Matthew J. Hornsey, What Happens When Groups Say Sorry: The
Effect of Intergroup Apologies on Their Recipients, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 474, 474
(2008). Scenarios were based on offenses committed against Australian prisoners of war during WWII,
harms committed by a corporation related to products liability in which eighteen Australians died, harms
to Australian athletes due to other state-sponsored doping in sports, evidence that Saudi banks and other
entities made financial contributions to terrorist organizations prior to a terrorist bombing in which
eighty-eight Australians died, and nuclear testing by France in the South Pacific in the 1990s. Id. at 476.
378. Id. at 478-82. Another study explored the responses of members of one group to an
apology offered by another group which had insulted them. The apology reduced anger, reduced the
desire for retribution, prevented decreases in satisfaction and respect for the other group, and increased
interest in the possibility of forgiveness. Diana J. Leonard, et al., Emotional Responses to Intergroup
Apology Mediate Intergroup Forgiveness and Retribution, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1198,
1200-02 (2011).
379. Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 298, at 1452-53 (discussing apologies
given by a hospital chief of staff).
380. See James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa:
Attributions ofBlame and the Struggle Over Apartheid, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 501, 509 (1999).
381. Filkins, supra note 261, at 18.
382. For instance, it may be infeasible for highly mobile troops to attend ceremonies.
383. Empirical research on these questions would be useful.
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course, this is another aspect of amends where appropriate deference needs to
be paid to the military on questions of safety, expediency, and feasibility.
Finally, designers ought to consider whether and to what extent there is
an appropriate role for third parties to play as mediators or intermediaries. As
we have noted, there may be cultural differences in the degree to which amends
offered through third parties are palatable, with members of more collectivist
cultures being more likely to find indirect apologies useful. 384 In addition, third
parties as mediators may be able to help identify and communicate the
particular needs of the victims and their families.
2. Offered to Whom?
At the most fundamental level, the individuals who are injured and the
families of those who are injured or killed would seem to be the most obvious
recipients of amends, including apologies or expressions of sympathy or
condolence. In recounting the impact of then-Secretary of State Madeline
Albright's visit to victims in the hospital in Kenya following the bombing of
the U.S. embassy there, Susan Hirsch notes that "the secretary knew well the
importance and value of speaking directly to victims and their families, and
expressing, officially, her condolences and sympathies."385 If such relational
acknowledgement was seen as important in a case, such as the bombings, in
which the United States was not the actor who caused the harm, it would seem
even more important-though likely more difficult-when the United States is
the actor who directly, if lawfully, caused the harm.
But while victims and their families might be the most appropriate
recipients of amends,386 it may be inevitable that amends in this context have a
wider audience. People in some cultures are more inclined to engage in group
decision making, with families or villages closely involved in consultation.
Similarly, people in some cultures are more likely to prefer communication
such as apologies to come indirectly through intermediaries. And amends can
have an effect on others who are in some way identified with the victims. 387
Thus, designers of amends processes ought to pay attention not only to
appropriate interaction with civilian victims and their families, but to the
broader audiences for amends as well.
CONCLUSION
While IIL does not demand compensation or more broadly constituted
amends processes as a response to lawful harm, a robust process of amends
384. See Ren & Gray, supra note 355, at 115; see also Michael J. A. Wohl et al., Why Group
Apologies Succeed and Fail: Intergroup Forgiveness and the Role ofPrimary and Secondary Emotions,
102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306 (2012) (exploring difficulties in the communication of
emotion between ingroups and outgroups and suggesting that apologies issued by proxy through an
ingroup member can be beneficial).
385. HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 44.
386. This priority is reflected in Obama's Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 13,732, supra note
27, § 2(b)(ii).
387. See supra notes 374-377 and accompanying text.
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making is consistent with and representative of IL's humanitarian
commitments. While many others have focused on possible amends for
unlawful harms, this Article is a first step in the larger process of designing
such amends processes for lawful harms. We began this work here by
identifying the vital importance of the role of amends in responding to lawful
harm including acknowledgment of the military's causal role in harmdoing,
promises of forbearance, greater attention to cultural differences, and more
inclusion of relevant stakeholders in the amends making process.
In identifying and addressing these design questions, we note the limited
empirical literature on amends in armed conflict388 and identify a number of
interesting empirical questions that arise in this context. In doing so, we chart a
path for future empirical studies. Much research still needs to be done in order
to fully understand the needs for and effects of making amends in the context of
armed conflict. For example, there is little existing research on how individuals
in affected countries react to current efforts to make amends through
condolence or solatia payments389 or how they would react to a more
relationship-oriented amends process. We have based our suggestions on the
existing research on amends, but the differences between the contexts of much
of the existing research and the settings and complications of armed conflict
make it imperative that additional research be conducted to explore these
nuances.39
Similarly, to our knowledge, no empirical research has explored the
experiences of military personnel who are tasked with making condolence or
solatia payments under the current system, or the relationships among amends,
moral injury, and self-forgiveness.391 Nor is there research specifically
exploring what military personnel know about such amends programs, how the
programs are viewed by various military actors, how condolence or solatia
payments as currently practiced shape perceptions of harm caused or
professional roles, or how a more relationship-oriented approach to amends
might alter these perceptions. And, finally, additional research on how amends
are perceived by broader audiences, including the U.S. public, foreign states,
and others, would also be instructive.
388. Only a single study tests the effect of amends on civilian populations. See Lyall et al.,
supra note 160. This literature generally focuses on the relationship between victimization and
counterinsurgency goals. See Andrew Beath et al., Winning Hearts and Minds? Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Afghanistan (MIT Working Paper No. 2011-14,2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id=1809677 (concluding that when sufficient initial levels of stability exist,
development programs can reduce violence and improve attitudes toward the government); Eli Berman
et al., Can Hearts & Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 119 J. POLL
ECON. 767, 799-802 (2011) (testing conflict data from Iraq to confirm hypothesis that improvements in
material conditions in conflict zones will enhance social and economic order. This is particularly true
when money is tailored to community needs); Condra et al., supra note 244 (concluding that in
Afghanistan, but not Iraq, reducing civilian casualties could disrupt insurgent recruitment).
389. For one exception, see Lyall et al., supra note 160.
390. Our analysis identifies a broad set of questions for apology researchers more generally:
the complexities of making amends when the underlying conduct is unacknowledged, the meaning and
effects of apologies offered for lawfully caused harms, and the intricacies of making amends in cross-
cultural contexts.
391. See Worthington & Langberg, supra note 276, at 275 (lamenting the lack of empirical
studies on self-forgiveness in combat veterans and active military personnel).
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A more robust understanding of the need for and reactions to amends for
legal injuries or killings in armed conflict settings would also shed light on a
broader set of questions about the meaning and functions of amends more
generally. A better understanding of amends in armed conflict is likely to
provide a clearer understanding of amends in other instances of lawfully caused
harm; to shed light on the cultural interplay between attributions of
responsibility, amends, and rituals; and to push our thinking forward about how
different forms of responsibility (e.g., legal responsibility, causal responsibility)
are understood.
In the meantime, we hope that states will work to design processes for
making amends for lawful harm that recognize the humanity of both the
injurers and the injured and that provide an effective mechanism for addressing
the harm caused. Such action need not take place at the level of the executive
branch or its equivalent. Militaries might themselves contemplate, design, and
implement their own expansive vision of amends as a recommitment to the
principle of humanity. 392 Such activity could reaffirm393 the military's basic
belief in the distinction between combatant and civilian casualties and the need
to treat all persons, even lawful civilian casualties, with dignity and respect.
392. For example, in the absence of active opposition from the new Administration, the U.S.
military is itself free to broadly interpret President Obama's Executive Order or its underlying principles
to generate and implement its own vision of amends.
393. The U.S. military, its allies, and its enemies might reasonably doubt the President-Elect's
appreciation for the Geneva Conventions. The President-Elect and his advisors have considered
reinstituting waterboarding, other outlawed interrogation techniques, and the targeting of involuntary
human shields such as the families of terrorists. John McCain to Donald Trump: U.S. Won 't Reinstate
Waterboarding, CBS (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-mccain-to-donald-trump-us-
wont-reinstate-waterboarding/ (quoting President-Elect Trump as saying "Right now, basically,
waterboarding is essentially not allowed as I understand it . . . . I would certainly like it to be, at a
minimum, at a minimum to allow that."); Alex Emmons, General Advising Donald Trump Says Killing
Terrorists'Families Might Be OK, THE INTERCEPT (May 19, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/05/19
/general-advising-donald-trump-says-killing-terrorists-families-might-be-ok/ (discussing a statement
from Gen. Michael Flynn, now the President-Elect's National Security Advisor). That said, the
President-Elect may moderate his views on the Geneva Conventions as he seeks out more counsel on the
issue. See Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump, in Interview,
Moderates Views but Defies Conventions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016
/11/22/us/politics/donald-trump-visit.html (suggesting that the President-Elect "had changed his mind
about the value of waterboarding after talking with James N. Mattis, a retired Marine Corps general,
who headed the United States Central Command"). But see Fred Kaplan, Trump Has Not Changed His
Mind About Torture, SLATE (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics
/war stories/2016/I l/trump-says-wasimpressed-by-mattistortureopposition but that s not the.ht
ml (revealing that Trump is in fact still open to waterboarding).
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